Euro Spectator: Implementing the Euro,1999 National Reports: Austrian Report/Belgian Report by LOUIS, Jean-Victor
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
LAW DEPARTMENT
together with
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2000/5
Euro Spectator: Implementing the Euro
1999
National Reports:
Austrian Report/Belgian Report
A project directed by:
JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS
BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)
All rights reserved.
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form
without permission of the authors.
© 2000 Euro Spectator, EUI
Printed in Italy in September 2000
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
I – 50016 San Domenico (FI)
Italy
National Reports
Austrian Report
HERTA BAUMANN, HELMUT LANG
Belgian Report
DIEGO DEVOS, PAUL MAGNETTE
WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF VINCENT MEUNIER,
JACQUES DELPÉRÉE
A project directed by:
PROF. JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS
Research assistants:
JULIO BAQUERO CRUZ
STEFANIA BARONCELLI
________________LIST OF RAPPORTEURS__
Herta Baumann. Assistant – Institute of Political Science University of
Vienna
Eric Clapham. Stockholm School of Economics
Louis Chauvel. Maître de conférences des universités a l’Institut
d’Etudes Politiques - Chercheur à l’OSC- Paris
Régis Chemain. Maître de conférences à l’Université de Paris X
Nanterre - Paris
Diego Devos. Conseiller au Service Juridique - Banque Nationale de
Belgique- Bruxelles
Nikos Frangakis. Director of the EKEME - Athens
Panos Kazakos. EKEME - Athens
Robert Kissack. Federal Trust - London
Wim Kösters. University of Bochum
Helmut Lang. University of Vienna
Jacques Le Cacheux. Professeur à l’Université de Pau et des pays de
l’Adour, Directeur du Département des études, OFCE, Paris - Observatoire
français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), PARIS
Ingo Linsenmann. Researcher - University of Cologne
Manuel López Escudero. Profesor Titular de Derecho Internacional
Público de la Universidad de Granada
Paul Magnette. Chargé de recherche au FNRS – Maître de conférences
à l’ULB - Bruxelles
Marina Mancini. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) - Rome.
Juan Carlos Monedero Fernández-Gala. Universidad Complutense de
Madrid
Thorsten Müller. Researcher - University of Cologne
Peter-Christian Müller-Graff. Professor at the University of Heidelberg
Miguel Poiares Maduro. IEEI - Lisbon
Elena Rigacci Hay. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) - Rome
Natalino Ronzitti. LUISS University, special counsellor at the Istituto
Affari Internazionali (IAI) - Rome.
Maria João Seabra. IEEI - Lisbon
Ana Isabel Soares Pinto. IEEI - Lisbon
Wolfgang Wessels. Professor at the University of Cologne - Research
Institute for Political Science and European Affairs - Jean-Monnet-Chair
“Euro Spectator: Implementing the Euro”
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2000/4 Page
Introductory Report    1
J.-V. LOUIS AND S. BARONCELLI
Summary of the National Reports: 17
Austria  17
Belgium 23
France 27
Germany 33
Greece 41
Italy 45
Portugal 51
Spain 59
Sweden 63
United Kingdom 71
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2000/5
Austrian Report   1
H. BAUMANN, H. LANG
Belgian Report 57
D. DEVOS, P. MAGNETTE,
 WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF V. MEUNIER AND J. DELPÉRÉE
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2000/6
French Report   1
L. CHAUVEL, R. CHEMAIN, J. LE CACHEUX
German Report 57
I. LINSENMANN, T. MÜLLER, P.-C. MÜLLER-GRAFF, W. WESSELS
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2000/7
Greek Report   1
P. KAZAKOS, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF N. FRANGAKIS
Italian Report 51
M. MANCINI, E. RIGACCI HAY, N. RONZITTI
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2000/8
Portuguese Report   1
M. POIARES MADURO, A. I. SOARES PINTO, M. J. SEABRA
Spanish Report 31
M. LÓPEZ ESCUDERO, J. C. MONEDERO FERNÁNDEZ-GALA
EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2000/9
Swedish Report   1
E. CLAPHAM
British Report 25
R. KISSACK
Synthesis Report 65
S. BARONCELLI
These documents are accessible in a different version
also in the Euro Spectator web site at the following
address: <http://www.iue.it/Law/eurospectator/>
SCREENING COMMITTEE
Michael Artis, Ramon Marimon, Yves Meny,
Natalino Ronzitti, Wolfgang Wessels, Jacques Ziller
The working papers Euro Spectator. Implementing the
euro have been realised thanks also to the contribution
of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, the Deutsche
Fortschungsgemeinschaft and the European Central
Bank
10
AUSTRIAN REPORT
Herta Baumann*
Helmut Lang**
1. Political Aspects
by Helmut Lang
1.1 Public Opinion
With the exception of late 1997 (see below) European Monetary Union (EMU)
has never been an important topic of public debate. After entering the third
stage of EMU, interest in euro-related topics concentrated seemingly on the
exchange rate of the euro against the American dollar1. Other issues publicly
debated were related to the introduction of the euro coins and notes in 2002.
Institutional questions about the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) or
political implications of EMU for Austria and the European Union are usually
not discussed, not even - as it seems - within the political parties (see below).
Public opinion polls concerning the euro did not take place frequently in 1999.
Two institutions conducted large-scale surveys on a quarterly basis: the Euro-
Initiative - the euro information centre of Austria's federal government - and the
Austrian Central Bank. However, the surveys of the Central Bank, based on a
sample of 2000 face-to-face interviews, are confidential and are intended for
internal use only. Therefore, I will concentrate on the surveys conducted by the
                                                
* Institute of Political Science - University of Vienna.
** University of Vienna.
1 This impression of the rapporteur was shared by some interview partners who interpreted it
as a certain lack of many journalist's understanding of the basic features of EMU and its
consequences for Austria. A member of the government's Euro-Initiative reported that the
most frequently asked question concerned the depreciation of the euro against the dollar.
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Euro-Initiative, which are based on samples of 1000 face-to-face interviews2, as
well as on the Eurobarometer studies3.
Overall support of the single currency has increased significantly since the
summer of 1997. At that time, a majority of the Austrian population still
opposed the euro (38% in favour and 50% against)4.
A significant change in public opinion concerning the euro took place in the last
quarter of 1997. Since then, a fairly stable net majority of more than 20% has
supported the single currency. In the last week of November 1997, the Freedom
Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs - FPÖ) organised a popular initiative in
favour of a referendum on the euro, arguing for a postponement of the third
stage of EMU (see also below: "The Freedom Party"). At about the same time,
the government started its information campaign in favour of the euro5. It seems
that the anti-euro campaign of the Freedom Party and the pro-euro campaign of
the government led to a public debate which resulted in a significant increase of
support of the euro.
Since the topic of EMU was very low key in the public debate before the
referendum about Austria's entry into the European Union in 1994, the euro was
debated intensely for the first time in public in the discussions ignited by the
popular initiative of the Freedom Party. During this debate many Austrians
probably realised for the first time that Austria would change the schilling for
the euro. At the same time, however, they realised that the main decisions had
already been taken. The most frequently mentioned argument of those, who did
                                                
2 The surveys for the Euro-Initiative are conducted by the "market-institute". Fieldwork for the
three studies so far published in 1999 took place respectively: 17/03/99-14/04/99 (997
interviews); 22/06/99-06/07/99 (511 interviews); 15/09/99-14/10/99 (1000 interviews).
3 Eurobarometer 50 and 51.
4 See the surveys of the Euro-Initiative, which always sum up the long-term trend of overall
support.
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not support the popular initiative of the Freedom party, was that a referendum at
that time would be useless6. This coincided with the view of the overwhelming
majority of legal experts who considered the main decisions concerning
Austria's participation in EMU as irrevocable.
Since December 1997 EMU support increased slowly from 55% to 63% in
October 1999. It reached the highest level in April 1999 with 69% and the
lowest in March 1998 with 53% in favour of the single currency.
                                                                                                                                                        
5 Both, the popular initiative of the Freedom Party and the starting of the government's
information campaign were announced in August 1997.
6 Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, 1997: Das Meinungsklima über das Euro-
Volksbegehren in Österreich [Public opinion about the popular initiative on the euro in
Austria]; Vienna
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Table 1 - Support of the single currency (in percentage)
very much in
favour
in favour against very much
against
October 1999 17 46 24 12
July 1999 17 45 27 12
April 1999 29 40 21 9
December
1998
16 49 22 11
September
1998
14 50 24 10
July 1998 12 42 24 11
March 1998 12 41 20 12
December
1997
15 40 24 6
September
1997
13 30 26 17
June 1997 13 25 26 24
Source: Survey on behalf of the Euro-Initiative, published in October 1999.
The conspicuous deviation of data in the April 1999 survey may be partly the
result of a differently worded question as compared with the studies conducted
afterwards7. Another study8 suggests, however, that support in favour of the
                                                
7 The question used in March was: "In May the European Union has decided on the
introduction of the single currency euro. What do you think about the single European
14
euro indeed reached its highest level so far in the first quarter of 1999,
supposedly as a reaction to the successful launching of the euro.
On the other hand, according to the Eurobarometer survey number 519, support
of the euro in Austria decreased sharply in the first quarter of 1999
(Eurobarometer 50: 57% in favour; Eurobarometer 51: 53% in favour). Austria
thus replaced Germany as the Euro-11 country with the lowest support of public
opinion for the euro. Net support dropped from 29% to 23%. Among the Euro-
11 only Finland shows a lower net support of the euro (21%).
The analysis by demographic variables shows that men are significantly more
supportive of the single currency than women; that support of the euro sharply
drops among those aged 60 or more and that the backing of the single currency
rises with formal education.
Geographically, support is weakest in the capital Vienna, which can be
attributed at least partly to the age structure. Relatively weak support is also
found in the eastern and southern states10. The euro receives strongest
endorsement in the western states11 with borders to Germany and Italy.
                                                                                                                                                        
currency?". Later on the question was: "Since January 1, 1999, the euro is the single currency
in Austria and 10 other European countries. What do you think about the single currency?".
8 A confidential study I could use as background information.
9 Fieldwork in March and April 1999; released in July 1999. Eurobarometer 50 was released
in March 1999; fieldwork was done in October and November 1998.
10 Burgenland, Lower Austria, Carinthia and Styria.
11 Upper Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg.
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Table 2 - Support of the euro by demographic variables (in percentage)
very much in
favour
in favour Against very much
against
Men 22 51 16 9
Women 13 41 31 14
Aged 15-29 21 50 21 7
Aged 30-39 19 46 21 12
Aged 40-49 20 51 20 9
Aged 50-59 20 55 21 3
Aged 60+ 9 32 34 24
Elementary
school
11 44 30 14
Higher school,
University
34 48 15 2
Upper Austria 14 58 23 5
Lower Austria,
Burgenland
13 51 26 10
Vienna 14 39 24 22
Styria,
Carinthia
20 39 33 6
Salzburg,
Tyrol,
Vorarlberg
26 47 12 14
Source: Survey on behalf of the Euro-Initiative, published in October 1999.
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This assessment of the euro largely coincides with economic expectations. The
more optimistic people are about the future development of the economy the
more they perceive the euro as positive. The net result of people who think the
economy will improve in the next 12 month minus those, who think it will
change for the worse, is, respectively:
Vienna   -1
Lower Austria and Burgenland   -6
Carinthia and Styria -10
Upper Austria  +7
Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg          +13
1.2 The current debate on EMU
Before Austria joined the European Union on January 1, 1995, (and thereby
accepted the whole "acquis" including the provisions for the monetary union)
the public debate widely ignored the topic of European Monetary Union and its
implications for Austria. The discussion was dominated by other topics, such as
the future of Austria's neutrality law in the context of the common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) and transit traffic.
The main reason for neglecting monetary union at the time of Austria's pre-
accession may have been that the topic seemed too distant and abstract at that
time (in 1994). The Freedom Party argued in the context of its popular initiative
in late 1997 that the government deliberately concealed the fact that a vote for
membership of the EU also meant a vote to replace the Austrian schilling by the
single currency. This would have made it much more difficult to get a pro-EU
vote at the referendum.
The coalition government always supported Austria's participation in the
monetary union and clearly stated the aim of wanting to belong to the first
17
group of countries entering the third stage of EMU. This position was illustrated
by a declaration concerning Article 118 of the EC-Treaty12, which was included
in the final act of the Accession Treaty13.
Since the year 1981, Austria had formed a de-facto monetary union with
Germany. Since then Austria strictly followed the policy of binding the
schilling to the German mark at a fixed rate of a little bit more than seven
schillings for one mark.
This policy was chosen mainly for two reasons:
a) Exchange-rate stability with Austria's by far most important trading partner
was highly desirable (about two thirds of imports and exports were exchanged
with Germany; about 80% of the tourists visiting Austria were Germans).
b) Price stability should be secured by binding the schilling to the traditionally
stable German mark14.
This policy of binding the schilling to the mark was considered highly
successful. As a consequence, the idea of a monetary union was not new to
Austria and the transition from a de-facto monetary union with Germany to the
European Monetary Union constitutes a relatively small change in Austria's
monetary policy. Austria loses the possibility to adjust the exchange rate in case
of serious trouble, but gains, on the other hand, a seat in the Council of the
European Central Bank (ECB).
Given the emergence of the Euro-zone, joining the Monetary Union together
with Germany was the only acceptable alternative for Austria15.
                                                
12 Former Article 109g.
13 Declaration 41. In this declaration the Austrian government confirmed its support of the
EMU and its determination to keep the schilling stable in order to contribute to the
implementation of the euro.
14 Lachs Thomas/Ritzberger-Grünwald Doris, 1998: Der Euro - Europas neue Währung;
Vienna; pages 126f.
15 See Lachs/Ritzberger-Grünwald 1998, page 129.
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1.3 Institutional Positions
1.3.1 Introduction
Before concentrating on the positions of the most important political institutions
I will make a comment on their role in the context of monetary union. This will
be followed by an overview of the current political situation in Austria.
The most important players in the political system of Austria are:
The government, now consisting of a coalition of the Freedom Party (FPÖ) and
the People's Party (Österreichische Volkspartei - ÖVP).
The social partners: the Federation of Austrian Trade Unions (Österreichischer
Gewerkschaftsbund - ÖGB) and the Chamber of Labour, the Chamber of
Commerce  and the Chambers of Agriculture. In the context of the EU, another
interest organisation has to be added: the Association of Austrian Industrialists
(Vereinigung Österreichischer Industrieller - VÖI), which represents Austria's
industry in the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
(UNICE)16.
The states ("Länder"), represented on the federal level by the "liaison office of
the states".
The Federation of Austrian Cities and Municipalities (Österreichischer Städte-
und Gemeindebund).
The Austrian Central Bank.
All these institutions take part in the normal co-ordination procedure to define
Austria's positions concerning EU-matters. They are also represented in the co-
ordination groups installed under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance and
the Austrian Central Bank to co-ordinate the preparations for the euro.
                                                
16 The Chamber of Commerce can not be a member of UNICE because it relies on
compulsory membership.
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The Austrian parliament enjoys the constitutional right to be comprehensively
informed about EU-policy initiatives and the legislative process and has the
right to take binding decisions which have to be observed by the members of
the government acting in the EC-Council. But since the coalition government
parties are not eager to bind its own ministers by parliamentary decisions, this
power of parliament is rarely used. The opposition parties may put topics on the
agenda but only the government parties can provide a majority to take
decisions. The influence of the opposition parties on Austria's EU policy is,
therefore, rather limited.
1.3.2 The Current Political Situation
After the general elections held on October 3, 1999, the political situation in
Austria was unclear and blocked. The SPÖ ruled out a coalition with the
Freedom Party (FPÖ) for several reasons, the biggest obstacle being the party
leader Jörg Haider. The ÖVP had committed itself to opposition in case of
falling behind the Freedom Party, which it did by a narrow margin of only 415
votes.
Official result of the general election of October 3, 1999:
SPÖ 33,15% 65 seats
FPÖ 26,91%, 52 seats
ÖVP 26,91%, 52 seats
Green Party 7,40% 14 seats
Liberal Forum 3,65% 0 seats17
                                                
17 The Liberal Forum this time missed the 4%-threshold needed to be represented in
Parliament.
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In mid-December the ÖVP gave up the self-binding decision for opposition and
started into coalition negotiations with the chairman of the SPÖ, Victor Klima.
These negotiations failed on January 21, 2000. Immediately afterwards, the
ÖVP started negotiations with the Freedom Party which were concluded in 10
days. The intention of the ÖVP to form a government with the Freedom Party
led to a public outcry in Austria and Europe. Nevertheless, the new government
coalition was sworn in by President Klestil on February 4, 2000.
In its first statements, the new government under chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel
committed itself to the need to reduce the deficit of the federal budget with a
view to the Growth and Stability Pact.
According to the autumn economic forecasts published by the European
Commission on November 24, 1999, Austria faces the worst prognosis of all the
15 member states as regards its budget deficit. The Commission predicts an
annual deficit of 2,6% of GDP for the year 2000 and of 2,4% for the year 2001,
which puts Austria a full percentage point behind the next to the last, France.
The figures predicted by the Austrian Stability Programme for the next two
years are 1,7% and 1,5% respectively18. The difference between the figures
mainly results from a tax reform concluded after the Stability Programme was
adopted. The reform will reduce the tax revenue by about 30 billion Austrian
schillings (2,18 billion euro). This represents a difficult situation for the
incoming government whose first task will be to present a budget compatible
with the Stability Pact.
Though the Freedom Party promised a number of potentially costly measures in
the election campaign, such as a flat-tax and the so-called "children-cheque"19,
                                                
18 Austrian Stability Programme for the years 1998 to 2002; dated 05/11/1998.
19 Every mother should get 5.700 schillings per month for a child under the age of seven years.
For each additional child under the age of seven she should get 2.850 schillings per month
(FPÖ - Der Haider-Prinzhorn Plan (Manifesto for the general elections); Vienna, 1999; page
32.)
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most experts expected that the Freedom Party, will, once in government,
commit itself to keep Austria's budget below the stability criteria20. The
working program of the government seems to confirm these expectations.
1.3.3 The Federal Government
The government always supported EMU and was determined to belong to the
first group of countries entering the third stage of EMU. Austria joined the EU
accepting the "acquis" without "opting-out" of the provisions concerning EMU
and declared that it wanted to belong to the "core of stability" from the
beginning. Shortly after joining the EU, on January 9, 1995, the Austrian
schilling joined the EMU exchange rate mechanism.
In its "coalition agreement", the former government (the SPÖ/ÖVP-coalition)
has confirmed that Austria wants to participate in every central field of
integration and to contribute to its further development. The government further
declared that it was committed to making a considerable effort in starting the
euro in accordance with the provisions and the timetable agreed in the Treaty of
Maastricht. The government expected that EMU could give a fresh impetus to
the economic development and employment in Europe21.
The core of the coalition agreement consisted of a programme for the
consolidation of the federal budget. Though the connection with the EMU was
not explicitly mentioned in the coalition agreement, it was always clear that an
effort to reduce the public deficit was needed to meet the Maastricht
convergence criteria.
The coalition agreement of the new government also concentrates on the
consolidation of the federal budget and contains a clear commitment to the euro
and monetary union.
                                                
20 Almost all of my interview-partners shared this view.
21 Koalitionsübereinkommen zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs und der
Österreichischen Volkspartei [Coalition agreement between the Austrian Social Democratic
Party and the Austrian People's Party] 11/03/1996; Vienna; page 16.
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1.3.4 Political Parties
It is rather difficult to get information from the political parties in Austria
concerning their positions on EMU, the Stability Pact and so forth. I could not
find any information concerning EMU on the homepages of the four
parliamentary parties and repeated requests were necessary to get at least some
sort of information22.
This remarkable inability to respond leads me to several speculations:
a) EMU, the Stability Pact, policy implications and related issues are of little
interest to Austria's main political parties. It seems that they have not produced
any position papers, conclusions, resolutions, statements etc.
b) The Austrian electorate obviously does not care much about these questions.
Therefore, the parties are not confronted with questions concerning their
positions or ideas about EMU and related topics. If voters had asked for their
opinion, the parties would have had their position papers and policy statements
prepared and would have sent them sooner.
c) A third and more general hypothesis is that Austria's political parties still
have not fully realised the close connection and interaction between the
European and the national level - or that they just do not care about. Therefore,
a seemingly European topic such as EMU is perceived as being distant. This,
again, could be connected to indifferent voters who do not expect their
representatives to be concerned with European matters which do not relate to
them directly.
d) Another hypothesis could be that short term thinking and pragmatism are so
wide-spread that the parties are completely concentrated on the technical
matters of the transition from the schilling to the euro and do not think about
fundamental questions or political implications.
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1.3.4.1 Social Democratic Party (Sozialistische Partei Österreichs - SPÖ)
For the Social Democratic Party the euro is the logical next step on the way to
European integration after the implementation of the common market. In the
view of the SPÖ, the whole project of European integration is the best way to
secure freedom, peace, welfare and employment all over Europe. EMU will
enhance the efficiency of the common market and thereby lead to higher
growth, lower inflation and higher employment and income. Of course, the
emphasis is on "putting jobs first". The euro should help to achieve that
paramount goal: "The euro must contribute to sustained growth, low inflation
and high levels of employment."23 Furthermore the euro should protect Europe
against the destabilising pressures of currency speculation and contribute to a
new and more stable world financial system.
The full support of European integration and the euro does not, however,
include the support of all the methods used. The Social Democrats oppose the
neoliberal-conservative approach to deregulate and to leave everything to
market forces. The SPÖ wants to complement the monetary union with a social
union. This implies that deregulation on the national level needs compensation
on the European level in order to secure economic and social stability. A certain
degree of co-ordination and harmonisation in the fields of economic, social and
environmental policies is considered necessary.
The main advantages of EMU for Austria can be seen in the abolition of
currency fluctuations and exchange rate exposure.
The Growth and Stability Pact is considered to be an important confidence
building measure but it has to be applied in such a way that it does not endanger
                                                                                                                                                        
22 With the exception of the Green Party, which was able to provide information quickly.
23 See the manifesto of the Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialists for the
elections to the European Parliament, to which the SPÖ referred: http://www.europarl.eu.int/-
pes/en/Working/Euro/Euro.htm.
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employment and does not intensify a cyclical downturn. At least the effect of
automatic stabilisers has to be secured.
The independence of the ECB is supported by the Social Democrats. It must
not, however, be used as a pretext to avoid dialogue and co-ordination between
the national and the European levels and the different actors in the field of
economic policy. To attain all the goals of EMU "it is essential to achieve an
appropriate policy mix between the national fiscal policies and the monetary
policy of the ECB". The independence of the European Central Bank "has to go
hand in hand with its democratic accountability, for which the natural
counterpart is the European Parliament."24 According to the Social Democrats,
the European Parliament should have the right to vote on the nominees for the
executive board of the ECB.
The Austrian socialist party's member in the Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament, Harald Ettl, criticised the dialogue
between the ECB and the European Parliament in January 1999, after a hearing
of the committee with the president of the ECB, Wim Duisenberg. According to
Ettl, Wim Duisenberg's appearance in the committee had nothing to do with
accountability and dialogue. Duisenberg had just tried to sell his policy well.
In the field of taxation, the following arguments were put forward:
"> unfair tax competition causes distortions in the Single Market and will lead
to the erosion of Member States' tax revenues. Better policy co-ordination is
required at EU level to prevent harmful tax competition in the form of unfair tax
breaks and hidden subsidies;
> taxation systems should be designed to favour the creation of jobs and the
protection of the environment"25.
                                                
24 All quotations: http://www.europarl.eu.int/pes/en/Working/Euro/Euro.htm.
25 http://www.europarl.eu.int/pes/En/Working/Priorities/market/singlemark.htm.
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1.3.4.2 The Austrian People's Party (ÖVP)26
The ÖVP fully supports EMU and Austria's membership in it. Several
statements of party members in parliament suggest that the ÖVP interprets
EMU as a very important next step for the project of European integration27.
Several advantages for Austria are mentioned:
> stability of exchange rates, which is especially important in the case of Italy,
Austria's second most important trading partner concerning agriculture;
> removal of transaction costs;
> belonging to one of the most important currencies world-wide;
> facilitation of trade and comparable prices in the Euro-area;
> over-proportional representation of a small country like Austria in the ECB.
The ÖVP strongly supports the independence of the ECB and price stability as
its primary target so that the other economic goals, such as economic growth or
employment, have to be attained without prejudice to price stability. These
goals should rather be solved by tax policy or budgetary measures.
1.3.4.3 The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)28
                                                
26 In spite of several requests since October I received some information from the Austrian
Peoples' Party only at the end of November.
27 European Monetary Union was discussed in parliament on several occasions. I used the
minutes of the sessions of the Main Committee of the National Council on 13/11/96 and
22/04/98, and the minutes of the plenary session of the National Council on 17/06/98, when
the popular initiative of the Freedom Party was discussed.
28 In response to my first inquiry the Freedom Party sent me two documents (the manifesto for
the general elections on 3 October 1999 and the party programme) that do not mention the
euro or EMU. After my reclamation and a reference to the Freedom Party's popular initiative
concerning the euro in late 1997, I received:
> two other copies of the manifesto for the general elections and the party programme;
> the manuscript of a speech, given by party leader Jörg Haider on 12 November 1999 to the
"state of the republic and the state of the FPÖ";
> a paper dealing with migration and asylum policy;
> other papers dealing with cultural policy, enlargement and structural policy;
> another paper called "The Freedom Party's positions for the future of Austria".
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It is a difficult task to evaluate the positions of the Freedom Party concerning
EMU, because it does not seem to have any. And even if it had, that would not
tell us much about its policy in the future29.
In 1997, the Freedom Party organised a popular initiative with the aim of
holding a plebiscite about the transition from the Austrian schilling to the
euro30. Legally, this question had already been decided by the plebiscite about
Austria's entry into the European Union in 199431. Based on opinion polls,
showing a majority of Austrians against the euro, the Freedom party hoped for a
huge number of votes for its popular initiative. But the referendum did not meet
the expectations of the Freedom Party for several reasons32. The arguments of
the Freedom Party were ambiguous and inconsistent. It proposed a plebiscite
about EMU, the result of which would have been irrelevant concerning
decisions already taken to join monetary union. The FPÖ did not argue against
EMU, but for a postponement because a majority of the member states could not
fulfil the convergence criteria. It opposed the euro in the short term, because it
would be, according to the FPÖ, weaker than the schilling. On the other hand, it
argued for binding the schilling to the euro. Above all, the Freedom Party could
not offer better alternatives33.
                                                                                                                                                        
All these papers have at least one thing in common: they do not deal with EMU and related
topics.
My requests to get an interview with a member of parliament responsible for economic affairs
also remained futile.
29 See for example the position of the FPÖ towards enlargement, which was always clearly
rejected. Last year, Party leader Haider even talked of the government acting like an
"occupying power", waging a war of extermination against Austria's agricultural sector and
selling off Austria ("Der Standard", 29.1.1998 and 10.9.1998). In November 1999, he
supported enlargement with certain conditions (i.e. transitional periods) and added that he had
never said otherwise ("Der Standard", 19.11.1999).
30 The referendum took place in the last week of November 1997.
31 For a discussion of the legal arguments of the Freedom Party, see for example Fischer
Heinz (Editor), 1998: Österreich und die Währungsunion; Vienna, New York; pages 70ff.
32 The referendum got the support of 253 949 voters (4,43% of the electorate), putting it on
number 13 out of 23 referendums in Austria at that time (Van der Bellen Alexander, 1998:
Das Euro-Volksbegehren der FPÖ; in: Khol/Ofner/Stirnemann (Eds.): Österreichisches
Jahrbuch für Politik 1997; Vienna; 112f.).
33 See Van der Bellen, 1998.
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The FPÖ repeated the arguments used during the campaign for the popular
initiative in the course of 1998. In the discussion on EMU in the Main
Committee (Hauptausschuß) of the National Council on April 22, 1998, the
Freedom Party tabled two motions. The most important of which demanded that
the Austrian representatives in the EU-Council should vote against the euro on
the basis that several member states (i.e. Italy and Belgium) had not fulfilled the
convergence criteria34.
In the coalition agreement with the ÖVP the Freedom Party committed itself to
EMU and the need to reduce the deficit of the federal budget.
1.3.4.4 The Green Party
The Green Party criticises EMU, its organisation and objectives, fundamentally
as an incarnation of the neo-liberal ideology. They are not against a monetary
union as such but against its neo-liberal features. This ideology concentrates on
the market and market forces as its central element and reduces freedom to the
freedom of making money. It discredits important values, such as social justice
and ecological policy and undermines democracy itself by reducing the
competencies of national democracies without creating compensations on the
European level.
The Greens interpret the EU as a possibility to create a European-wide union of
peace and justice where important goals such as sustainable and ecological
growth and social justice are attainable. The current reality, however, is the
completely lopsided integration of markets by widely ignoring a political union
which results in a significant loss of democratic accountability and legitimacy.
Decisions are taken behind closed doors in the Council of Ministers, the
                                                
34 The second motion called upon the government to inform the European Commission, the
European Parliament and the member states, that Austria's contributions to the community
budget must not increase and that countries that qualified for the third stage of the EMU must
not receive any further payments out of the cohesion fund. Both motions were rejected by the
majority of the Committee.
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European Council and the European Central Bank. This situation is made worse
by the narrowing of national policy options through convergence criteria and
the Stability Pact. The national governments block the development of a "social
union" and the development of a common European policy in the fields of
employment, taxes and economy. The intended result of this strategy is the
reduction of social standards through internal European economic competition.
From this fundamental critique follow the arguments of the Greens for a better
organisation of EMU. The one-sided orientation on monetary policy and price
stability of EMU should be supplemented by social and ecological goals. The
Greens had always argued for another set of convergence criteria. The public
finance criteria should have been replaced by criteria which specify the
reduction of unemployment and the fulfilment of obligations of international
treaties concerning environmental protection.
The Stability Pact should be extended to include binding and controllable social
and employment criteria as well as sanctions for failing to fulfil these criteria. In
addition to this, the evaluation of a member state's budgetary compliance with
the criteria of the Stability Pact should at least partly exclude public investments
promoting employment.
The ECB should be subject to the principles of democratic accountability and
control. Furthermore, as already indicated, the objective of monetary stability
should be supplemented by other economic criteria.
To achieve the goals of sustainable and ecological economic growth and social
justice under the conditions of the common market and monetary union the
Greens also argue for measures in different policy fields:
> Binding minimum social standards;
> Homogeneous, European-wide taxation of property and speculative profit;
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> Harmonisation of corporate taxes together with the introduction of
contributions to finance employment policies;
> Gradual development of a European financial adjustment;
> Reducing the cost of labour through an ecological tax reform.
1.3.5 Social Partners
First of all the joint position of Austria's social partners will be summarised and
then I will illustrate the most important differences, especially between the
employees' associations and the employers' associations.
The Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs35 conducted a study on
"room for manoeuvring in economic policy", which was published in May
199836. The main message of the study was that the internal market and EMU
have already restricted the member state's competence in the field of national
economic policy in the preparatory phase. This has not only happened because
of the shifting of competencies to the European level but also because of the
need to meet the convergence criteria and the pressure to improve international
competitiveness in the race for investment. The study concludes: "If the loss of
national competencies is not to result in a vacuum in economic policy, these
tasks need to be performed on a supra-national level."37
The study analyses the possibilities for policy actions in different policy areas
under the conditions of monetary union.
A - Monetary policy:
                                                
35 This is a sub-committee of the Joint Commission on Wages and Prices (the centre-piece of
Austria's Social Partnership). Its task is to conduct surveys concerning economic and social
policies and to issue recommendations that contribute to a stable purchasing power, steady
economic growth and full employment.
36 Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs, 1998: Room for Manoeuvring in
Economic Policy; Vienna.
37 Advisory Council for Economic and Social Affairs, 1998; Preface.
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The study stresses that the common monetary policy has clear advantages: "The
European Central Bank will enjoy more room for policy measures than all the
constituent national central banks of EMU. Also there will no longer be
currency speculation between member states."38 From the Austrian point of
view, a "responsible monetary policy (rather than a single-mindedly restrictive
one)" should try to boost the economy by using the room available for interest
rate reductions. Following the apparent price stability which has recently been
established, the ESCB should now (without prejudice to the objective of price
stability, according to Art. 105 (1) EC-Treaty) concentrate on the other
objectives of the EU such as - among others - a high level of employment and of
social protection (Art. 2 EC-Treaty).
The Advisory Council stresses the importance of co-ordination between the
different players of economic policy, because stability goes beyond price
stability. Only a well-co-ordinated macro-economic policy-mix can provide
long-term stability39.
Further propositions in the field of monetary policy are to use low interest rates
to stimulate exports through an appreciation of the US dollar against the euro
and a regulatory framework for capital flows40.
B - Fiscal policy:
The Advisory Council holds the view that public policy needs to maintain its
ability to counteract a downturn in the business cycle. It is, therefore, necessary
to interpret the Stability Pact in a way that allows a certain degree of counter
activity.
                                                
38 Ibid, page 87.
39 Ibid, page 89.
40 Ibid, page 90f.
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National fiscal policy should focus on promoting employment by reducing tax
on labour, the promotion of investment and by enhancing the effect of
expenditures on employment.
Concerning institutional matters on the European level, the study asks for the
creation of "a suitable mechanism for harmonising taxes", meaning qualified
majority voting in the Council instead of unanimity41.
C - Tax policy:
The common market and monetary union reduce the national autonomy in the
field of tax policy significantly. It is to be expected that indirect taxes will
become more harmonised due to competitive pressures. Concerning direct
taxes, the study argues for harmonisation of several taxes, especially taxation at
source and corporate taxes, in order to avoid a competitive race towards lower
taxes. This competition would lead to an ever lower taxation of capital versus a
higher taxation of labour. Taking into account the European unemployment
rate, the tax policy should aim at reversing that development and to reduce the
cost of labour. Therefore, the Advisory Council stated: "A tax policy needs to
provide a clear framework for competition in a common market, but must not be
subject to competition itself."42 It is necessary to agree on a certain minimum
tax rate for capital gains and profits on the European level. In this context it
would also be necessary to find a consensus on the kind of tax brakes that are
compatible with the goals of the common market, such as tax brakes for
investment in research and development.
The overall conclusion is that major changes in the tax structure and the type of
taxes are only possible through a supranationally co-ordinated approach. The
Austrian tax policy should, therefore, aspire to be more active on the
supranational level.
                                                
41 Ibid, page 93.
42 Ibid, page 94.
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D - Wage and Income policy:
Austria already has some experience in conducting a wage and income policy
under the conditions of a monetary union due to the binding of the schilling to
the German mark since 1981. Austria's social partners have shown that they are
capable of carrying out a responsible wage and income policy in the framework
of a monetary union. To ensure a stable macroeconomic development, it will be
important to continue a wage policy guided by long-term productivity
development.
E - Policies to improve the quality of a location:
The policies needed to improve the quality of a location - such as education and
training, regulation of the labour market, rules for working time, infrastructure
or the efficiency of public administration - remain largely at the national level.
The room for policy action on the national level, however, is restricted by the
availability of public funds. The study identifies ample room for national policy
action in areas relating to a more efficient production of public goods. This
means reducing public service production costs and reducing the public
administration follow-up costs.
F - Social and Labour Market Policy:
It is the opinion of the Austrian social partners that it "would be neither
possible, nor useful, to merge the 15 different social security systems, with their
widely differing traditions, into a single common system. Neither would it be
desirable to have all policy measures adopted in the member states centrally
administrated from Brussels".43
                                                
43 Ibid, page 102.
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On the national level, efforts should be made to improve education and training,
to enhance employment in new areas of activity, to optimise the distribution of
work (meaning mainly to enhance the flexibility of labour) and to improve the
active labour market policy.
On the European level, a closer co-ordination of the social policies of individual
member states as well as the establishment of binding minimum standards is
necessary in order to avoid a "competitive race towards lower social standards
(social dumping) or a violation of established minimum standards"44. This
includes the strengthening of the social dialogue on a European level, which is
necessary when considering the repercussions of EMU on social policy. From
the Austrian point of view, the integration of the social partners into the policy
process was highly successful and should, therefore, be repeated on the
European level.
To avoid social dumping, a closer network of minimum standards in the area of
social security is desirable. Taking into account the conditions in the less
developed member states, such harmonised standards are likely to remain below
the level of protection currently existing in Austria.
Another important point from the perspective of Austria's social partners is to
keep enough room for national policy action in case of short-term economic
downturns: "Complementary to the European monetary and fiscal policies'
focus on stability, corresponding room for employment and social policy
measures must be preserved for periods of economic crises."45
1.3.6 Employees' Associations
The main preoccupation of the trade unions and the Chamber of Labour is
employment or, more precisely, the attainment of full employment together with
the maintenance (or improvement) of the quality of working conditions,
                                                
44 Ibid, page 104.
45 Ibid, page 105.
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protective labour legislation and wages. EMU has been and is still supported by
the employees' associations. It is perceived as a possible means of reaching their
goals on the European level. The main advantages of the EMU for Austria are
as follows: the abolition of unstable exchange rates; the participation in one of
the world's leading currencies and the replacement of the German
"Bundesbank" by the ECB.
The policy of the German Bundesbank had few supporters within the
employees' associations, who sharply criticised its high interest rates. The
unions and the Chamber of Labour are hoping that the ECB will be less
stubborn and will concentrate on the European and not only on the German
situation. This will represent an improvement for Austria as compared to the
previous situation - when the Austrian Central Bank had to follow the decisions
of the German Central Bank - as the governor of the Austrian Central Bank will
participate in the decisions of the ECB-Council. On the other hand, however,
EMU and its emphasis on the Central Bank's independence led to changes in the
organisation of the Austrian Central Bank which reduced the influence of the
social partners in the decisions of the Central Bank.
The main critique of the labour representatives concerns the perception that
EMU in its current shape is an expression of the neo-liberal ideology which
widely ignores the importance of employment. Neo-liberalism is opposed
because of various reasons:
+ it sees the markets as the most important and efficient mechanism to organise
an economy; as a consequence, unemployment can be reduced only through the
market mechanism;
+ it perceives the state and interest organisations as dispensable and even
contra-productive, because they interfere with the market forces;
+ it attributes unemployment mainly to so-called over-regulation, meaning
anything from unemployment benefits to protective labour legislation.
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The philosophical background of the neo-liberal ideology is the interpretation
of men as self-interested individuals but not as part of the society and a social
being46.
This ideology can be recognised in the main features of EMU, most of all in the
one-sided concentration of EMU and the ECB on price stability and the strong
emphasis on the independence of the ECB. From this critique the following
requests are deduced:
- First and foremost, economic growth and full employment should be made
equal goals to monetary stability;
- Policy co-ordination between the different actors of economic policy has to be
improved. Independence of the ECB must not be used as a pretext to avoid a
genuine dialogue with the social partners on the European level. Policy co-
ordination is important because, in the view of the employees' associations, it is
not only the Central Bank that influences price stability but also fiscal policy
and of course wage and price policy. To avoid unnecessary disturbances due to
a lack of mutual information, early co-ordination is needed.
- The executive board of the ECB should be staffed with experts with different
backgrounds from several economic sectors who are acquainted with the
interests of employees. Today, neo-liberal central bankers, who do not perceive
trade unions as their potential partners in achieving the goal of overall stability
and growth, dominate the ECB and the ESCB. The selection of "excessively
stability-oriented" and "inflation paranoid" central bankers has also to do with
the public perception: a central banker has to be like that, other features would
be interpreted as weakness47.
- Last, but not least, the highly centralised monetary policy needs a higher level
of co-ordination of related policies on the European level, which could be
summarised under the heading of an European social union. This would have to
                                                
46 See: Federation of Austrian Trade Unions, 1999: Wirtschaft statt Herrschaft; Vienna.
47 Interview with Günther Chaloupek, Chamber of Labour.
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include, among other measures, efforts to reduce the relatively high tax burden
on labour as compared to capital. This could be achieved by a certain degree of
tax harmonisation.
1.3.7 Employers' Associations
The employers' associations stress almost exclusively the advantages of EMU
and have only minor points of critique. By far the most important aspect of
EMU is the creation of a large common market with a single currency which
removes the destabilising and harmful currency fluctuations. This makes life
much easier for a country with a very open and export oriented economy.
Especially the depreciations of the Italian lira in the 1990ies caused severe
problems for many parts of the Austrian economy.
Another advantage is the removal of currency-related transaction costs and
belonging to one of the world's most important currencies. This is especially
favourable for Austria's small and medium sized enterprises with trading links
with Eastern European countries. In many cases, the euro now replaces the US
dollar or the German mark as trading currency, thereby transferring the currency
exposure to the trading partners.
Another big advantage of EMU can be seen in the external pressure to reduce
the budget deficit. Not only is the reduction of the public debt positive but also
the pressure on the government to organise the public sector more efficiently48.
Furthermore, the stronger competition due to transparent prices has made it
even more important to make Austria an attractive investment. This, in turn,
also exerts pressure for measures favourable for Austria's industry.
However, the advantages of the common market and the single currency do not
materialise by themselves. The new economic environment has to be
acknowledged and the new opportunities have to be taken. Enhanced
competition is positive for the economy as a whole but poses serious risks and
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challenges for many enterprises. And in this respect, parts of the Austrian
economy still have a long way to go. Many firms have not yet realised the
profundity of the changes that EMU brings with it49.
1.3.8 Chambers of Agriculture
The chambers of agriculture have concentrated in all their statements regarding
EMU on one point: that the single currency will do away with exchange-rate
caused distortions. This is especially important in the case of Italy, Austria's
second largest market for farm products. For example, the depreciation of the
Italian lira in 1995 caused financial damage of more than one billion schillings
(about 73 million euro) for Austria's agriculture.
Further advantages of EMU are the removal of the agricultural monetary regime
which constituted an enormously complicated mechanism and brought
disadvantages for farmers in hard-currency countries such as Austria.
Finally, the euro will provide the financial foundation which the common
agricultural policy has always needed. The euro will also offer fair competitive
terms to all participants for the first time.
All this taken together strengthens the position of Europe's agriculture on the
world market and the bargaining position of the EU in international trade
negotiations.
1.3.9 Reactions to the policy decisions of the ECB
The decision of the ECB to reduce the interest rates on April 8, 1999, was
welcomed in Austria. The lowering of the interest rates had been expected,
though most commentators were surprised by the size of the reduction.
Economic experts classified the decision of the ECB as a positive signal but
doubted whether it had positive effects on economic growth.
                                                                                                                                                        
48 Interview with Erhard Fürst, Association of Austrian Industrialists.
49 Interview with Matthias Koch, Chamber of Commerce.
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The Governor of the Austrian Central Bank argued that monetary policy had
contributed to economic growth. He appealed to the government to act now and
reform the labour market and secure a balanced budget50.
Much more controversial was the decision of the ECB on November 4, to raise
the interest rates by 0,5%. The Minister of Finance, Rudolf Edlinger, called the
ECB-decision unnecessary at that time but added that the upward trend of the
economy was not in danger. The Minister of Economic Affairs, Hannes
Farnleitner, reacted similarly. According to him, the ECB had over-estimated
the danger of inflation, but the economic situation would not be damaged.
The employees' associations clearly rejected the step of the ECB. They did not
share the view of the ECB Governing Council that price stability was at risk.
Mr. Günther Chaloupek, from the Chamber of Labour, described the decision to
raise the interest rates "very strange" and "ridiculous"51. The employers'
associations also would have preferred to wait for a stronger economic upturn
before raising the interest rates. Mr. Erhard Fürst, from the Association of
Austrian Industrialists, would have preferred a smaller reduction of the interest
rates in April which could have avoided November's increase, for which he also
could not see any reason.
1.3.10 Institutional and Procedural Matters
The Stability Pact is - generally speaking - accepted but not loved by the main
political institutions of Austria. As Thomas Wieser, a Department Head in the
Ministry of Finance, pointed out, the Stability and Growth Pact is nothing new
but simply specifies the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht. In the
discussions about the Stability Pact, there had been "two groups" of countries:
Germany that pushed it intensely, and the other 14 countries that were not
completely convinced of its necessity. Austria could have lived with a slightly
                                                
50 "Die Presse", 10/04/1999.
51 Interview with Günther Chaloupek, Chamber of Labour.
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larger room for interpretation but finally accepted the Stability Pact. It may have
positive effects for all participants of the euro-zone including Austria,
especially by providing an additional external motivation to reduce budget
deficits.
Mr. Wolfgang Ruttenstorfer, state secretary in the Ministry of Finance, sees the
advantage of the Stability and Growth Pact in its function to speed up necessary
reforms in Austria. In connection with the Stability Pact, Austria decided to
implement strict budget controlling in the federal ministries and improved co-
ordination among the different levels of the state (federal level, the states, cities
and municipalities). To achieve the latter, an inner-Austrian Stability Pact and
consultation mechanism between the territorial authorities was concluded52.
The necessity of measures ensuring that no single country's irresponsible deficit
spending policy could endanger the stability of the euro is widely
acknowledged, but, of course, there are different points of emphasis. Political
organisations on the so-called right of the political spectrum (employers'
associations, Peoples Party) tend to be satisfied with the Stability Pact and its
focus on balanced budgets. Political organisations on the left (employees'
associations, Social Democratic Party, Green Party) tend to criticise the limited
scope for policy measures in the case of an economic downturn. They criticise
the one-sided concentration on price stability and attribute more importance to
employment. The Green Party suggests to add social and ecological goals to the
deficit criteria of the Stability Pact.
Hans Sallmutter, head of the Union of Private Employees, one of the most
important unions within the Federation of Austrian Trade Unions, interpreted
the Stability Pact as a de-facto aggravation of the 3% deficit criterion, because it
requests budgets close to balance or in surplus in times of economic growth.
Mr. Sallmutter concludes that this means the almost total loss of any room for
                                                
52 Austrian Press Agency (APA), 12/04/99.
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manoeuvre for national fiscal policy. This emasculates also the national
parliament and may require further austerity measures53.
The ECB still has some way to go to get appreciation in Austria. So far, critical
comments dominate. This concerns most of all the lack of transparency and the
overestimation of inflationary tendencies. The left side of the political spectrum
also criticises an insufficient preparedness of the ECB (and the employer's side)
for an open dialogue and again its overestimation of price stability as compared
to economic growth and employment.
Most criticism concerns the perceived lack of transparency, for example that the
monthly reports do not contain useful information, that an inflation forecast and
the ECB's target inflation has been missing and that the minutes of the meetings
of the ECB-Council are not published. An expert in the Ministry for Labour,
Health and Social Affairs summarised this as the most extreme expression of
independence with a dogmatic and messianic touch. Mr. Thomas Wieser,
Department Head in the Ministry of Finance, concluded that the ECB will need
some time, before it "acts with the cool confidence of a mature institution".
The existing co-operation mechanisms linking the ECB with other actors of the
political system are assessed differently according to different interests.
Representatives of the political left demand a better co-ordination of related
policies (monetary policy, economic policy, wages and prices) and an
intensified dialogue with the ECB. They make the criticism that the employer's
side is not interested in genuine talks and that the ECB lacks the willingness to
listen.
Accordingly, the employer's side thinks that the current co-ordination
mechanisms are sufficient. An enhanced integration of the ECB into the
                                                
53 Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten, 1997: Hart, härter, Euro?; Vienna; page 6.
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political system could endanger the necessary independence of the Central Bank
and is therefore opposed54.
According to Mr. Thomas Wieser, the Euro-11 Council does not yet work
completely satisfactorily. He identifies two aspects. First, it is rather a sequence
of monologues than a real discussion. Second, the Euro-11 discussions mostly
miss the point of co-ordinating economic policies. It is rather a slightly more
open exchange of views about topics that are also discussed in the ensuing
Ecofin Council. The reason for that is mainly the much more limited number of
participants in the Euro-11 meetings (not only of member states but also of
officials).
The responsibility of the insufficient development of the Euro-11 is placed on
the German presidency, especially on Mr. Oscar Lafontaine, who was not overly
concerned with the Euro-11.
                                                
54 Interview with Erhard Fürst, Association of Austrian Industrialists.
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2. Legal Framework
by Herta Baumann
2.1 The law as it stands
The preparations for the introduction of the single currency were designed as a
long-term project within the Austrian administration. In 1996 a co-ordination
mechanism was established, with representatives of the federal ministries, the
governments of the states ("Länder"), the local authorities and the social
partners. Within this co-ordination mechanism several working groups dealt
with special aspects of the changeover to the single currency. The working
group "Legistik" dealt with the legal framework of the changeover. This group
compiled a list with all legal provisions that would have to be adjusted.
Subsequently a plan for legislative adaptation on the federal level was
designed.55 On the state level ("Länder") and on the local authorities level
similar plans were outlined.
The plan for legislative adaptations is based on two principles: Firstly, each
federal ministry is responsible for the adjustment of the legislative provisions
within its sphere of competence; and secondly, each legislative provision should
be changed individually and not through a general amendment.
The main part of the legislative adaptations relates to "technical" aspects,
meaning the replacement of references to the schilling as such or to a certain
amount of schillings by references to the euro. A more complex part concerns
substantive adjustments, due to the loss of competencies in the monetary field
                                                
55 Federal Ministry of Finance: Euro-Umstellung. Aktionsplan des Bundes [Transition to the
euro], Vienna 1997.
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and the new role of the Austrian Central Bank within the ESCB, and due to the
two Council regulations relating to the introduction of the euro.56
These substantive changes were accomplished in four different fields:
1. The adaptation of the legal framework of the public finances between the
different levels of government.57
2. Adjustments in the private law, including major modifications of the
provisions concerning corporations and companies.58
3. Changes in the law of taxation and the re-denomination of public debt.59
4.The new Statute of the Austrian Central Bank.60
These amendments cover the necessary adjustments at the start of the
transitional period. Further amendments will be necessary at the start of the
circulation of euro banknotes and coins, especially physical re-denominations of
legal provisions referring to the schilling.
2.2 The Austrian Stability Pact
                                                
56 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the
introduction of the euro, OJ L 162, 19.6.1997, pp. 1-3; and Council Regulation (EC) No.
974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro, OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, pp. 1-5.
57 Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund, den Ländern und den Gemeinden über einen
Konsultationsmechanismus und einen künftigen Stabilitätspakt der Gebietskörperschaften
[Agreement on a consultation mechanism between the territorial authorities], BGBl I No.
35/1999; and Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund, den Ländern und den Gemeinden betreffend
die Koordination der Haushaltsführung von Bund, Ländern und Gemeinden - Österreichischer
Stabilitätspakt [Austrian Stability-Pact], BGBl I No. 101/1999.
58 Erstes Euro-Justiz-Begleitgesetz [Accessory-Law to the Introduction of the Euro,
concerning adjustments of the private law], BGBl I No. 125/1998; hereinafter: Private Law
Amendment.
59 Erstes Euro-Finanzbegleitgesetz [Accessory-Law to the Introduction of the Euro,
concerning adjustments of the financial law], BGBl I No. 126/1998; hereinafter: Financial
Law Amendment.
60 Nationalbankgesetz [Central Bank Act ], BGBl I No. 60/1998.
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With reference to the European Stability and Growth Pact, the Austrian
territorial authorities adopted two agreements61, concerning the co-ordination of
their budgetary and financial positions. The Community law calls for an overall
public budget close to balance or in surplus, including the finances of the
regional and local authorities. In the Austrian federal system, on the regional
level, the nine states ("Länder") have legislative and executive power of their
own; on the local level the cities ("Städte") and municipalities ("Gemeinden")
have an autonomous executive sphere of responsibility ("eigener
Wirkungsbereich"), but no legislative power. Because of this federal structure it
was necessary to find an agreement on the co-ordination of the budgetary and
financial positions between the territorial authorities. The Austrian Constitution
offers in its Article 15a the possibility of agreements between the federal
government and the governments of the states ("Länder"), so called "Article
15a-Agreements"; but it does not provide for the municipalities and the cities to
be parties to such agreements, since the local authorities have no legislative
power. Therefore a constitutional amendment was necessary, which enabled the
cities and municipalities, represented by the Federation of Austrian Cities and
Municipalities ("Österreichischer Städte- und Gemeindebund), to be parties to
these two agreements.62
In June 1998, the first agreement, a "consultation mechanism" was adopted.63
Its purpose is to improve the financial co-ordination between central, regional
and local authorities. Under the mechanism, authorities will be required to
                                                
61 Agreement on a consultation mechanism between the territorial authorities, BGBl I No.
35/1999 and Austrian Stability-Pact, BGBl I No. 101/1999.
62 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über Ermächtigungen des Österreichischen Gemeindebundes und
des Österreichischen Städtebundes [Constitutional law on the authorisation of the Austrian
Communal and Municipal Federation], BGBl I No. 61/1998.
63 Agreement on a consultation mechanism between the territorial authorities, BGBl I No.
35/1999.
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provide information on legal changes which may have financial effects on other
authorities.64 Within a certain period of time, the other territorial authorities can
submit their opinions to the bill.65 On their demand a consultation committee,
with representatives of the federal, the regional and the local authorities shall
deal with the financial effects of the bill and shall try to find a solution on the
bearing of the costs.66 A decision by that committee shall bind every territorial
authority. Where there is no agreement on bearing costs, the authorities which
have suffered costs may sue for compensation. Any dispute arising out of the
agreement shall be decided by the Austrian Constitutional Court.67 Article 6 of
the agreement stipulates, that the agreement is not applicable to legal changes,
which are imposed by Community legislation, or which are necessary to be in
conformity with Community law.
The "consultation mechanism" was a prerequisite for the Austrian Stability
Pact. The main focus of the "consultation mechanism" is to carry out an
equalisation of burden between the territorial authorities with reference to new
legislation of one of these authorities. Still, the federal character of Austria,
with its different levels of authorities and their legal capacities, has to be
considered and maintained. Thus, this "consultation mechanism" can only lead
to an agreement on bearing costs (by unanimity) and not to the avoidance of
legal changes.68
The Austrian Stability Pact69 was adopted at the end of 1998. It contains
provisions on the acknowledgement of joint budget co-ordination, medium-term
orientation of budget management, drawing-up of stability programmes and of
the allocation of any penalties to the authorities causing an excessive deficit.
                                                
64 Article 1, Section 1, 2 and 3 leg cit.
65 Article 1, Section 4 leg cit.
66 Article 2, 3 and 4 leg cit.
67 Article 4, Section 2 leg cit.
68 Government Bill, Commentary, 1210 Blg NR 20. GP.
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The Austrian Stability Pact refers to the Stability and Growth Pact on
Community level. Besides the budgetary co-ordination it lays down the
procedure of the allocation of the deficit ratio of 3% of GDP between the
central, regional and local authorities.70 In a first step a co-ordination
committee, with representatives of the territorial authorities, shall agree on the
allocation of the deficit ratio; without such an agreement, Article 4, paragraph 3
stipulates, that from the overall public deficit ratio of 3%, the share of the
federal deficit shall be 2.7% and the share of the regional and local deficits shall
be 0.3% of GDP. The Austrian Stability Pact sets out a complex system of
allocation rules of the deficit ratio between the different regional and local
authorities. It governs the shifting of allotted deficit ratios in case of a surplus
or an excessive deficit of one of the regional or local budgets. It also provides
for any sanctions because of an excessive overall public deficit, stipulating that
each territorial authority, which is responsible for the excessive deficit, shall
bear the burden of the sanctions, applied by the Council in accordance with
Article 104, paragraph 11 EC-Treaty.
Article 3 of the Austrian Stability Pact provides that the federal government
shall design and submit stability programmes. Because Article 3 contains a
mere repetition of Community Law, it is redundant.
These two agreements on co-operation and co-ordination of the public finances
of the different territorial levels are very important for the Austrian political
system, because of the interwoven character of the public finances. It exists an
elaborated fiscal equalisation between central and regional governments. Most
taxes are federal ones and therefore the revenues have to be transferred to the
                                                                                                                                                        
69 Austrian Stability Pact, BGBl I No. 101/1999.
70 Article 4 Austrian Stability Pact.
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regional and local level. These transfers constitute the main source of revenue
for the states ("Länder") and communities.
The Austrian Stability Programme71 sets out that "the budgetary policy target is
an overall public budgets deficit of 1.5% of GDP for normal cyclical
situations."72 The decline of the deficit ratio shall be reached by reducing the
deficit of the federal budget to 1.9% of GDP and with the budgetary positions
of the regional and local authorities in surplus of 0.5% of GDP.
With reference to the fiscal equalisation and the objectives of the Austrian
Stability Programme, the Austrian Stability Pact cannot solve two problems:
Firstly, it only rules the procedure of the allocation of the 3% deficit ratio, but it
does not provide for a procedure in case of divergence with the figures of the
Austrian Stability Programme: Which territorial authority shall be responsible
for such a divergence and which authority shall reduce its deficit additionally?73
Secondly, the interwoven character of the public finances leaves no room for
corrective budgetary action on the regional and local level.74 The Austrian
Stability Pact does not alter this situation.
2.3 Private law
The adjustments in private law take place in two steps: In a first phase,
applicable as from the start of the transitional period, substantive changes were
laid down, which were necessary to avoid legal uncertainty, to enhance legal
clarity and to ensure the timely preparation for firms and citizens. The Private
                                                
71 Federal Ministry of Finance: Austrian Stability Programme for the Period 1998 to 2002,
Vienna 1998.
72 Austrian Stability Programme, p. 4.
73 Lehner, Gerhard: Der innerösterreichische Stabilitätspakt [The -Austrian Stability Pact], in:
Khol/Ofner/Stirnemann (eds.): Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1998, Vienna 1999, p.
374.
74 Lehner, p. 377.
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Law Amendment is based on the two Council regulations75 relating to the
introduction of the euro. Although these regulations contain mainly monetary
law provisions, some important principles of private law are also affected.
Firstly, the principle of the continuity of contracts; Article 3 of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1103/97 provides that the introduction of the euro does not
excuse the unilateral alteration or termination of contracts. Furthermore, the re-
denomination, which means changing the unit in which the amount of
outstanding debt is stated from a national currency unit to the euro unit, does
not have the effect of altering any other term of the debt, especially does not
alter the value. The Austrian private law is perfectly in line with these
principles. The principle of the continuity of contracts in case of an alteration of
the legal tender, is deeply incorporated in Austrian private law, since during this
century, several currency reforms took place in Austria. Even in case of
hyperinflation, it was standing jurisprudence, that the changeover should be a
nominal one, thus the burden of the risk of realignment is borne by the
creditor.76 Therefore it was not necessary to take legislative measures to enforce
the principle of nominal value. However, because of the bad experience with
previous currency reforms, it has been explicitly stated by members of the
federal government that the changeover to the euro is not a currency reform
(with changes in the inner value), but only a currency conversion (only a change
in the denomination).77
                                                
75 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1103/97; and Council Regulation (EC) No. 974/98.
76 Kathrein, Georg: Aspekte der Umsetzung in Privatrecht [Adjustments in Private law], in:
Ditlbache/Höllinger (eds.): Ökonomische und juristische Aspekte der Europäischen
Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, Vienna 1997, p. 66.
77 Edlinger, Rudolf (Federal Minister of Finance): Die Neuordnung der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank am Vorabend der EURO-Einführung, in: Khol/Ofner/Stirnemann (eds.):
Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1997, Vienna 1998, p. 436 and Stanzel, Anton: Der
Anpassungsbedarf für das österreichische Recht [The necessary adjustments within the
Austrian law], in: Rill/Griller: Rechtsfragen der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und
Währungsunion, Vienna 1998, p. 112.
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The Private Law Amendment contains:
1. Changes in the law of accountancy: since 1 January 1999 the firms can make
out their balance sheet alternatively, either in schillings or in euros. Further new
provisions deal with the booking of the changeover costs.
2. Procedural law and the law of the land register: actions and entries are now
also valid if made in the euro unit.
3. Consumer legislation: in medium and long term contracts with consumers,
the monetary amount must be denominated in schilling and euro.
4. The most substantive changes concern company law and new standards of
value, due to the ending of the key interest rate of the Austrian Central Bank:
basically, according to Article 6, paragraph 2 and Article 8, paragraph 2,
Council Regulation (EC) No. 974/98, the economic agents shall be free to use
the single currency through the transitional period or not. Thus, with the
introduction of the euro, the economic agents shall gain the possibility to found
joint stock companies in schilling or in euros. Changes in the company law
concern: the possibility to found a new corporation in euros and to convert the
joint capital of existing corporations into euros;78 and in relation to the
changeover, the procedure for the adjustment of the memorandum of
association was simplified. But the most remarkable change is the introduction
of non-par-value shares.79 With this legislative measure the system of the
Austrian corporation law was fundamentally altered, since before only par-
value-shares were allowed. Although this change is not essential because of the
introduction of the single currency, it constitutes a useful measure for a
balanced changeover to the euro unit. Without a nominal amount the conversion
and smoothing of the par value is not necessary. In accordance with Community
legislation there is no obligation to convert the joint capital and the shares to
euros, nevertheless, the new legislation has put a "gentle" pressure on
                                                
78 Article I, Section 8 and Article IV Private Law Amendment.
79 Article IV, Section 8 Private Law Amendment.
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corporations, because after the transitional period, it will be no longer be
possible for non-converted companies to make a registration in the Austrian
company register.80
With the integration of the Austrian Central Bank in the ESCB and the
attribution of its monetary instruments to the ECB, the key interest rates of the
Austrian Central Bank are no longer available as standards of value. It is a
general accepted principle of the Austrian law that in case of the end of a
particular standard of value a similar standard of value shall apply, taking into
account the functions of the original one and the intentions of the parties.81 The
Private Law Amendment explicitly states this general principle.82 Nevertheless,
since in many legal provisions reference is made to the key interest rates of the
Austrian Central Bank as standards of value, new "artificial" key interest rates
were introduced to replace the key interest rates of the Austrian Central Bank.83
With this new "reference interest rates", which shall be adopted and altered by
the federal government, legal certainty shall be enforced.
The majority of the adjustments in private law concern the replacement of
references to the schilling in legal provisions by references to the euro.
Although Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 974/98 stipulates that a
physical re-denomination is not necessary, preamble (20) of that Regulation
lays down, that "for reason of clarity it may be desirable that the physical re-
denomination will take place as soon as appropriate". On this legal basis, the
federal ministry of justice will submit - in a second phase - a bill with these
                                                
80 Article X, Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 Private Law Amendment.
81 Reich-Rohrwig, Johannes: Euro-Umstellung: Gesellschaftsrecht, Bilanz- und Zivilrecht,
Vienna 1998, p. 40.
82 Article I, Section 2, paragraph 1 Private Law Amendment.
83 Article I, Section 1 Private Law Amendment.
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physical re-denominations. This amendment shall enter into force with the start
of the circulation of the euro banknotes and coins.84
2.4 Financial Law
Similar to the Private Law Amendment, also the Financial Law Amendment can
be considered as the first step in the adaptations of the taxation and banking
legislation. The major part of the replacement of references to the schilling by
references to the euro, and the smoothing of the amounts in the euro unit, will
be adopted at the start of the circulation of the euro banknotes and coins.85
Therefore, this first Financial Law Amendment contains the necessary
adaptations for a balanced changeover during the transitional period: mainly,
references to the schilling and to the amended Private Law provisions were
adopted, but also provisions concerning public debt: Article 1 Financial Law
Amendment states the re-denomination of the public debt in the euro unit, in
accordance with Article 8, paragraph 4 Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98.
Article 2 Financial Law Amendment provides that private issuers may
redenominate their debt in the euro unit, too. In the taxation law some special
rules for the transitional period were adopted, because during the transitional
period schilling and euro are equal legal tenders in Austria, amongst other
technical adjustments.86 The adaptation of the banking legislation87 relates to
references to the amended law of corporation, and it specifically anticipates
necessary transformations, such as those that will derive from a drafted Council
Directive concerning the solvency of banks88.
                                                
84 Kathrein, p. 76; and Government Bill, Commentary, 1203 Blg NR 20. GP.
85 Government Bill, Commentary, 1187 Blg NR 20. GP.
86 Articles 3 to 6 Financial Law Amendment.
87 Article 8 Financial Law Amendment.
88 Draft Directive Concerning the Change of Council Directive (EEC) No. 647/89.
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The amendment of the banking law as well as the legislative changes
concerning the supervision of insurance undertakings89 demonstrate that on the
occasion of the introduction of the single currency many provisions without
reference to the single currency were adapted. As a result, the adoption of the
euro has led to legal clarity and legal certainty to a great extent.
2.5 The new Statute of the Austrian Central Bank
The core of the legislative adaptations in the course of the introduction of the
single currency consists in the new Statute of the Austrian Central Bank. With
the integration of the Austrian Central Bank in the ESCB and the requirement of
its independence a large part of the legal basis of the Austrian Central Bank had
to be changed. Before the legislative changes, the Austrian Central Bank was
directed by the General Council, which comprised representatives of the
government and the economic interest groups. The composition of the General
Council reflected the characteristic Austrian corporatism the so called "Social
partnership".90 The General Council took all basic decisions on monetary
policy. The Board of Executive Directors conducted the current business. It had
to report to and to act in accordance with the General Council's guidance.
Furthermore, a state commissioner, representing the Federal Ministry of
Finance, exercised control over the Austrian Central Bank's activities to ensure
compliance with the Central Bank Act.
The objective of the new Statute, laid down in the Central Bank Act 199891, is,
on the one hand to achieve full compatibility with Community Legislation, and
                                                
89 Article 7 Financial Law Amendment.
90 The interest groups take part in almost every decision on the political level, their
representatives are members of the parliament and other important decision making bodies,
such as the General Council of the Austrian Central Bank.
91 Nationalbankgesetz [Central Bank Act ], BGBl I No. 60/1998.
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on the other hand to maintain the characteristic structure of the Austrian Central
Bank as far as possible. The amendment of the Central Bank Act - once again -
refers not only to the adoption of the single currency, but also to national
legislation: through this amendment, requirements of the national legal system
were also fulfilled.92 The two major requirements of the Community law
independence and integration in the ESCB, led to a wide range of legal changes;
concerning the independence of the Austrian Central Bank, the decision making
power was transferred from the General Council to the Board of Executive
Directors; the appointment procedure of the members of the Board of Executive
Directors, their minimum term of office and the grounds for their dismissal were
regulated in accordance with Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute; the provisions
concerning the incompatibility of further activities were extended.
Concerning the integration of the Austrian Central Bank in the ESCB the
provisions about its objectives, powers and tasks were changed.93 The
instruments of monetary control had to be adjusted to the competencies of the
ESCB.94
The Austrian Central Bank is a joint stock company. The former main decision-
body, the General Council, has now only advisory capacities and has the
function of the supervisory board of a joint stock company.95 Since the members
of the General Council - representatives of the social partners - do not fulfil the
requirement of personal independence, it was necessary to remove the Council's
former competencies in the area of monetary policy.
                                                
92 Government Bill, Commentary, 1080 Blg NR 20. GP
93 Section 2 Central Bank Act.
94 Article X Central Bank Act.
95 Sections 20 to 31 Central Bank Act.
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The new decision making body in monetary policy is the Board of Executive
Directors:96 It consists of the Governor as its chairman, the Vice-Governor and
two other members. All of them are appointed for five years, the grounds for
their dismissal are in conformity with Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute and any
activity susceptible of doubts as to their personal independence are prohibited.
Section 34 Central Bank Act stipulates explicitly that the Governor and Vice-
Governor when acting as members of the ECB Governing and General Council
are not bound by any decisions of the Bank's General Council or Board of
Executive Directors.
The power of the state commissioner was reduced97. The only remaining right is
to attend the shareholders' General Meeting and the General Council meetings
in an advisory capacity. Although the Austrian Central Bank is now "an integral
part of the ESCB"98, it continues to fulfil other functions, unless the Governing
Council of the ECB finds, in accordance with Article 14.4. ESCB Statute, that
these functions interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB.99
2.6 National law from the EC Perspective
From the point of view of the European Commission "legislation in Austria is
compatible with the requirements of the Treaty and the ESCB Statute."100
Although this statement was made in early 1998 explicitly referring to the new
Central Bank Act, the finding should still be the same, since all relevant
amendments were drafted at that time and since there are no further statements
to the contrary. An expert of the Federal Ministry of Justice stated, that no
                                                
96 Sections 33 to 36 Central Bank Act.
97 Section 40 Central Bank Act.
98 Section 2 Central Bank Act.
99 Sections 4 and 7 Central Bank Act.
100 European Commission: Convergence Report 1998, COM(98) 1999 final, 25 March 1998
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concerns existed about the consistency of the Austrian legislation with
Community law.101
Three aspects of the legislation relating to the euro are noteworthy:
1. The current amendments cover the necessary adjustments at the start of the
transitional period. Further amendments will be necessary at the start of the
circulation of euro banknotes and coins. These adjustments especially concern
the replacement of references in legal provisions to the schilling by references
to the euro. This is not necessary, since the Community provisions, which
stipulate that references to national currencies shall be read as references to the
euro, are directly applicable. But for the purpose of legal clarity and certainty
the affected provisions will be amended.
2. Many legislative changes which were made with the adoption of the euro, do
not refer to the euro, but to other realms of Community or national legislation:
the new provisions fulfil also other requirements of the Community law or of
the national law. As a result, the adoption of the euro leads to legal clarity and
legal certainty in a great extent.
3. Many of the new provisions, especially in the Central Bank Act, are very
similar to the provisions in the Treaty or in the ESCB Statute, sometimes even
literally.
2.7 The Application of the law
Since the new provisions have only been applicable since 1 January 1999, there
are no surveys about proceedings in this realm. An expert of the Ministry of
Justice stated that he has neither information about current proceedings nor
about judgments concerning the adoption of the euro.102
                                                
101 Telephone-Interview 23 November 1999.
102 Telephone-Interview 23 November 1999.
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3. Some Trends Towards Spill Over
by Helmut Lang
Members of Austria's former federal government called the euro on several
occasions an important step on the way to better and more comprehensive
European integration. Further steps of integration are seen as unavoidable and
necessary. On the occasion of the final decision about the participants of the
first group of countries entering the third stage of EMU in the beginning of May
1998, then Chancellor Klima and Foreign Minister Schüssel declared that the
euro enforces a European economic policy. The Chancellor went on to say that
EMU will not only be a driving force for a better co-ordination of economic and
social policies but hopefully also for the common foreign and security policy103.
The first priority is seen in the creation of jobs through European-wide effort
and co-ordination. Consequently, employment was one of the main priorities of
Austria's EU-presidency in the second half of 1998.
An Austrian-wide consensus exists concerning the necessity of tax
harmonisation or co-ordination - another priority of Austria's EU-presidency.
More precisely, minimum levels of the taxation at the source and corporate
taxes to avoid a competition race towards lower taxes are seen as an immediate
priority. Consequently, Austria always argued for qualified majority voting in
the Council of Ministers in the field of taxes and will continue to do so. Mr.
Erhard Fürst, from the Association of Austrian Industrialists, points out that
certain minimum levels for direct taxes to avoid unfair competition are
supported. But harmonisation must not lead to tax increases. A certain level of
limited tax competition is stimulating and should continue to exist104.
                                                
103 Austrian Press Agency (APA), 03/05/98.
104 Interview with Erhard Fürst, Association of Austrian Industrialists.
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Consensus between the employees' and the employers' associations exists also
concerning the necessity of addressing the topics of tax evasion and tax
avoidance through loopholes105.
Another priority is seen in European-wide efforts to reduce the tax-burden on
labour.
In the medium-term, the former Minister of Finance, Rudolf Edlinger, expected
that EMU will put pressure on a European-wide co-ordination of social,
ecological and health-standards106. This should not include, however, a
harmonisation or equalisation of social security systems. A European-wide
minimum wage should not be included in the co-ordination of social security
because of different levels of productivity. A concern of the employees'
associations is the possibility of wage-dumping due to a competition to improve
the quality of a location. Therefore, a certain co-ordination of wage negotiations
could be useful. The employers' associations would prefer to restrict the wage
negotiations to the national level with the argument that productivity is
determined nationally.
Not surprisingly, political organisations belonging to the political right
welcome a reduction of state interference and do not tend to argue in favour of
compensation for the loss of competencies of the nation state on the European
level. The political left, on the other hand, favours the creation of EU policies in
the fields in which nation states lose their influence. Demands for a social union
and better co-ordination of policies on the European level therefore usually
come from the Social Democrats, the Green Party and the trade unions.
                                                
105 Interviews with Günther Chaloupek and Matthias Koch.
106 Austrian Press Agency (APA), 17/06/98.
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Foreword
This being the first report, some preliminary remarks may be necessary
concerning this part of the report:
1. Given the traditional analytical requisite that public opinions are largely
influenced by opinion-makers, we will begin with “institutional positions”.
If, for reasons of harmonisation, the suggested structure needed to be strictly
followed, this would not make any problem.
2. The sources of the analysis of “institutional positions” are documents
published by state institutions, political parties, trade-unions, lobbies… and
completed by press articles when necessary. EMU matters being the object
of large consensus in Belgium, some institutions have not published
opinions on this question in the last ten months. The analysis is thus not
really exhaustive, though most segments of Belgian élites are represented.
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It must be added that, even when public institutions publish opinions on
these questions, they rarely give rise to public debate: it must be remembered
that the existence of an official position may be very confidential in practice.
3. The sources of the analysis of “public opinion” attitudes are unfortunately
limited, in the Belgian case, to European polls. As far as the author of this
section is aware, there have indeed been no national poll on these questions
in the last ten months. Methodological precautions usually applied to
Eurobarometer thereby apply :
- the “confidence limit” of Eurobarometer is rather large. It is 2.7% for
observed percentages of 30 or 70% and 3.0% for observed percentages of
40 or 60%. This means that only large differences should be taken as
significant ;
- it is well known that  the high level of aggregation adopted to reach
harmonised results at the EU level conceals most sociological and
cultural variations ;
- as Belgium is taken as a whole, regional differences can not be
underlined.
1.1 Opinion makers and the Euro
1.1.1 Introduction
In Belgium, European integration has always been the object of a large consensus
among political leaders and organised interests. Well before the adoption of the
Maastricht treaty, the conviction that Belgium was a too small and too open
economic space to manage a truly independent monetary policy was widespread.
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Belgian leaders were convinced, during the negotiations of the Maastricht treaty,
that the EMU would help the country, which had entered the Mark zone some years
earlier, retrieve some part of its monetary sovereignty. Some conservative and even
socialist politicians were also convinced that this would help realise structural
reforms which would otherwise be opposed strong internal reluctance.
The only segments of the Belgian political class who opposed these projects during
the ratification of the Maastricht treaty were the extreme-right wing parties,
supporting a nationalist view of the State’s independence and usually opposed to
any form of further integration; and the Greens who, though they agreed with the
objectives of the EMU, contested the austerity inherent in the process of
convergence.
These initial positions have not been fundamentally altered since then. The
government has continued to present the Euro as an advantage for national
economic interests and as a starting-point for further European integration. A
political division remains visible between those who think that the Euro requires
further budgetary discipline and structural reforms of the labour market and those
who are trying to use it as a means for growth and employment policies. The
opposition remains limited to the left-wing and right-wing parties who initially
criticised the project.
The absence of public debates on these issues is another crucial peculiarity of the
Belgian situation as compared to other European States.
1.1.2 Governmental positions
Belgium was governed, until June 1999, by a centre-left government, composed of
christian-democrat and socialist parties. The Prime Minister, during this first part of
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the year, was the Flemish Christian-democrat Jean-Luc Dehaene, who had himself
negotiated the Maastricht treaty.
In a speech before a forum of Belgian industries in October 1998, he
summarised the traditional position of his government concerning the Euro107.
The common currency, he argued, will enhance the economic stability of the
country, and simultaneously strengthen economic growth. Taking a more clearly
right-wing position, he added that the Euro would strengthen budgetary
discipline, internally necessary but long delayed, and that it would help launch
deeper reforms of the labour market. Finally, from a more European point of
view, he concluded that the Euro could give rise to spill over in terms of fiscal
and social harmonisation, and that it would enhance the European Union’s
weight in international forums.
This restatement of classic pro-Euro arguments is largely shared by most
political forces in Belgium. The idea that the Euro is the inception of a new
phase of integration, because a common monetary policy requires a better co-
ordination of economic policies and the gradual creation of a European social
and fiscal basis, is a commonplace in Belgium. The impact of the Euro on
budgetary policies and on the labour market are, however, more debated.
The new government, installed after the general elections of June 1999, has not
altered the traditional Belgian position so far. The coalition directed by the
Flemish liberal Guy Verhofstad is composed of liberal, socialist and Green
parties.
European matters appeared as secondary preoccupations in the government’s
declaration in July. The government recalled the official positions of its
predecessor concerning the next IGC (deep institutional reform before the next
enlargements) and made plain that it would follow the classic line according to
                                                
107 Jean-Luc DEHAENE, L’Euro, une nouvelle chance pour la Belgique, Discours au Forum
Euro Entreprises, La Hulpe, 01 octobre 1998.
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which the creation of a fiscal and social basis in European law is considered by
Belgian authorities as a natural consequence of the EMU108. It must be noticed
that the tough positions of the former government on budgetary discipline and
reforms of the labour market have disappeared from these positions. The
government has not given more precise information so far, and no debate on
this question has been held in the Parliament.
1.1.3 Left-wing nuances
Left-wing parties, namely Green and socialist parties, have expressed some
nuances about this official position, though without trying to give rise to public
debates.
The Flemish and French-speaking socialist parties have not published opinions
on these questions recently. But their traditional position is usually more critical
than that of the PSE of which they are part. In its Congress on employment in
March 1999, the PSE had indeed tried to combine doctrines of economic and
budgetary discipline with objectives of growth and employment, considering
these two sets of objectives as equally important, and carefully avoiding to
precise how this combination could be reached in practice109. By contrast, the
Belgian Parti socialiste has always had a more traditional discourse, stating
notably that “the European public power has to be able to combat capitalism”,
and that in order to use the Euro as a means towards social progress and full
employment, a European economic government is necessary, to counterbalance
the European Central Bank and contribute to the emergence of a fiscal and
social Europe110. This being a clear difference with the former Prime Minister’s
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109 A European Employment Pact for a New European Way, Report from PES Party Leaders,
A. Guterres, Milan, 1 & 2 March 1999.
110 Parti socialiste, Construire l’Europe dans une perspective internationale, Bruxelles, mars
1998.
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argument that economy can not be governed nowadays, and that the idea of a
“European economic government” is absurd.
Green parties have also, though with less emphatic and more precise opinions,
tried to nuance the Belgian consensus on the EMU. During the campaign for the
June 1999 European elections, ECOLO (French-speaking Green party),
denounced the asymmetry of the European Union, where monetary policies are
centralised while fiscal and social matters remain submitted to less co-ordinated
mechanisms, and the risks of social and fiscal dumping inherent in this
asymmetry. In addition to the classic Belgian argument that fiscal and social
harmonisation are necessary after the implementation of the Euro, this Green
party has required stronger environmental co-ordination and the creation of a
European tax on international financial movements (Tobin Tax)111. Following
their French-speaking colleagues on these points, the Flemish Greens
(AGALEV) have moreover insisted on the necessity to enhance the
transparency of the European Central Bank and its accountability to the
European Parliament112.
1.1.4 Trade-unions : the quest for a social Europe
Belgian trade unions usually share left-wing parties’ opinions on the EMU.
Following the arguments made by the CSE during its Congress in Helsinki in June
1999, they criticise the ECB for following the objective of price stability at the
expense of the other missions defined by the treaty (art. 105 CE: contribute, without
prejudice of this objective, to support the general economic policies in the
Community…).
The Confédération des syndicats chrétiens (CSC), the largest trade-union
confederation of the country, has notably published a detailed study of the
European monetary policy, before the ECB’s decision to reduce interest rates in
                                                
111 Ecolo, Par-dessus le marché, refaire l’Europe, Bruxelles, June 1999.
112 AGALEV, Levende Europese democratie, in Europa Magazine, maart 1999, p. 7.
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April 1999. In march 1999, this trade-union pleaded for a rapid and massive
reduction of interest rates by the ECB, arguing that the small reductions made
until then had been lower than inflation rates, so that they had had no effects on
economic growth113.
The socialist and liberal trade unions share this diagnosis and regularly recall
that the EMU is not an end in itself and that the ECB must opt for policies
which contribute to economic growth and cohesion. They recall their traditional
position that the EMU requires social and fiscal cohesion to avoid competition
between Member states and social dumping, and notably plead for the adoption
of a legally effective Charter of social rights114. The independence of the ECB
and its dialogue with the European Parliament is usually not debated.
1.1.5 Other interest groups : practical problems
Organised interests play an important role in the Belgium political system. Their
comments on the Euro have, however, been very rare, and limited to some
expected practical problems of the transition towards the Euro in January 2002.
The Fédération des entreprises de Belgique (Federation of Belgian Industries,
FEB) has not published opinions on the EMU so far. It is usually in favour of
the Euro, on the ground of classic economic reasoning (stability, lower
transaction costs…). Belgian industries actually worry about the practical
effects the Euro might have in everyday management rather than about macro-
economic questions. The FEB has published a “Eurobarometer”, based on an
inquiry with 300 industries, showing that most of them fear the practical
consequences (on their accounts, transactions…) of the transition to the Euro
and that only a minority of them are already adapting to the Euro115. The
                                                
113 Confédération des syndicats chrétiens, Un indicateur politique pour juger la contribution
de la BCE à la réalisation de croissance et de l’emploi dans l’UEM, Brussels, March 1999.
114 Confédération générale des syndicats libéraux de Belgique, Europe, Progrès ou déclin
social ?, Congrès du 18 décembre 1998, Bruxelles.
115 Fédération des entreprises de Belgique, Eurobaromètre n°1, Bruxelles, mars 1999.
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President of this Federation has taken the example of his own enterprise in an
interview: only one of his 4000 customers has asked his enterprise receipts in
Euro so far. The inquiry made by the FEB reveals less pessimistic scenarios of
adaptation: 40% of Belgian industries sometimes send receipts in Euro; 9,7%
have published their annual accounts in Euro; 6,5% give their employees their
salaries in Euro116. These are still very limited proportions, and another inquiry
made by a bank (Bacob) with its customers shows that 72% of them do not plan
to use Euro before the very last moment117. The idea that the technical transition
to the Euro might give rise to deep practical problems in 2002, amounting to a
sort of second bug, seems to be growing in Belgium, though no inquiry has
been made on this question so far.
The Union des classes moyennes, an organisation of shop-keepers, has
published a communiqué arguing that the transition to the Euro should be
delayed to February 2002, because… January is traditionally the period of sales
in Belgium, and they fear this important economic event might be disturbed by
Euro-problems118.
To conclude with practical problems, an independent organisation of
consumers, Test-achat, has published a study on transaction costs since the
introduction of the Euro, showing that most banks had enhanced their costs.
They denounce this practice, while the banks answer that, given the fixed
exchange rates they are unable to draw benefits from exchange rates and must
therefor charge customers with standard costs for Euroland exchanges119.
Though these might appear as details, compared to macro-economic questions,
they should not be ignored. As will be shown in the following section, the
Belgian public opinion seems to worry about the practical effects of the Euro
more than about its macro-economic consequences. The legitimacy of the
                                                
116 Ibid.
117 See Le Soir, 30 juin 1999.
118 Union des classes moyennes, Y a de quoi râler, Communiqué, Bruxelles, mars 1999.
119 See Le Soir, 9 April 1999.
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European currency certainly depends on the solution of these material problems
as much as on its perceived general economic results.
1.1.6 Economists and monetary institutions
As in most other European countries, economic and financial newspapers play
an important role in the public’s perception of economic events. The opinions
published by these organs should thus not be ignored.
The ECB’s decision to reduce the main interest rate on April 8th 1999, has
generally been welcomed by economists in Belgium. Two arguments were
made. First, this proved that the ECB was not following a unilateral line and
that it was able to pursue the general objectives of the Community’s economic
policy. Second, this decision was seen as an answer to political discourses from
France and Germany, which would enhance the ECB’s independence because
tensions with political leaders would decline. Some commentators added that
this decision would, given the necessity of a comprehensive policy-mix,
encourage governments to further reduce public deficits and to enhance the
flexibility of labour markets120.
The Governor of the Belgian Central Bank, the French-speaking socialist Guy
Quaden, has been very discrete in this period. In an interview with the most
read French-speaking newspaper (Le Soir), he has supported the ECB’s policy.
He first argued that the ECB and national central banks are actually, and not
only formally, independent from political organs while at the same time able to
listen to political messages. He also tried to forge a consensus on the ECB’s
decision, arguing on the one hand that reducing interest rates was a good thing
for economic growth, and recalling on the other hand that this reduced the
benefits of those who, actually a very large proportion of the Belgian
population, spare and “invest” a part of their salaries. He has finally tried to
avoid conflicts between Flemish and French-speaking authorities, recalling that
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the Belgian Central Bank respected rules of parity and maintained the balance
between the interests of the North and the South of the country. The governor
has, in other words, played a subtle political role in trying to prevent political
tensions about monetary policies121.
The ECB’s decision to enhance its rates on November 4 1999 has similarly been
welcomed by most commentators. While most general newspapers just
mentioned the fact without commentaries, economic papers and economists
interviewed generally supported this decision. It was defined by the influent
Echo de la Bourse as a “brilliant evidence of independence”, a realistic and
long-term decision122. Though some economists were surprised by the level of
the enhancement, they understood it as a sign of stability, as this gave the ECB
the possibility not to change its rates for a longer period. Some also underlined
that this decision demonstrated that the ECB could follow the general interest
and not be strictly influenced by some member states, as most German
economists were not favourable to this decision which was on the other hand
welcomed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain… The governor of the Belgian National
Bank, Guy Quaden, again organised a press conference to explain and justify
this decision: he notable insisted on the fact that it would not affect economic
growth, and that it could be seen as a contribution to employment policies since
it was a guarantee of long-term growth and stability.
1.2 Public Opinion123
1.2.1 General support for the Euro
The last Eurobarometer polls confirm that the Belgian population largely
supports the Euro. 76% of persons asked in March-April 1999 answered that
                                                                                                                                                        
120 See L’Echo de la Bourse, 10 April 1999.
121 See Le Soir, 2 April 1999.
122 L’Echo de la Bourse, 05 November 1999.
123 All the data mentioned in this section are drawn from Eurobarometer 51, Spring 1999.
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they were “for” the Euro, 2% more than in the former inquiry. Belgium thereby
has the third highest score in the EU, after Luxembourg and Italy. This is a
particularly high score if one underlines two parallel trends.
First, the general support for the Euro in the EU has been declining since the
end of 1998, after a two-year period of constant growth (47% “for” in March
1997; 64% in September 1998; 61% in March 1999)124. Belgium is here an
exception to this evolution.
Second, Belgium, which had been among the stronger supporters of European
integration generally speaking until 1994, has become since then a relatively
weak supporter. Only 47% of persons asked in March 1999 think that
“generally speaking (…) Belgian membership of the European Union is a good
thing”. Compared with the scores of Ireland (78%), Luxembourg (77%), the
Netherlands (73%), this is a relatively weak score, Belgium being at the ninth
rank, ex æquo with France. Apart from Germany and Finland, only classically
Eurosceptic countries (Sweden, Austria and the United Kingdom) have lower
scores. The same results are reached when the other classic Eurobarometer
question is used (Taking everything into consideration, would you say that
Belgium has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European
Union ?). Only 44% of persons asked answer that Belgium has benefited from
EU membership, with again nine other member states reaching higher scores.
This means that, in spite of declining support for European integration generally
speaking, Belgium is among the strongest supporters of the Euro.
This contrast can not be easily explained. The relatively weak support for
European integration generally speaking can be seen as an element of a
typically Belgian distrust for public authorities: in national polls, only 25% of
persons asked generally support the government125. But why, if people do not
                                                
124 Similar trends may be observed in the euro-zone : there were 52% for in March 1997 ;
70% in September 98 ; 68% in March 1999.
125 See the polls published by La Libre Belgique four times a year.
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trust the EU in very large proportions, are they nevertheless in favour of the
Euro? Probably – hypothesis are here the only possible interpretation given the
absence of more precise inquiries – because they have been convinced by
official positions: the Euro will strengthen the weight of the country, contribute
to economic growth… Another poll shows that persons asked think that their
country will benefit from Euro-membership (65%, Belgium being in this
question at the third highest score)126. Also probably because they consider the
practical advantages of the common currency: as Belgian citizens are used to
travelling around Europe, they welcome the end of exchange rates and different
national currencies.
Another aspect of Eurobarometer polls confirms these hypotheses. Asked
whether they think monetary matters should be dealt with at the national or
European level, 77% of persons asked are in favour of a European decision-
making in March 1999. There, Belgium reaches the third score, just after Italy
(81%) and the Netherlands (80%). The former experience of a monetary union
with Luxembourg might help explain this enthusiasm – though the dimensions
of this experience and the Euro are not comparable. More probable is the
hypothesis, made by many political scientists, that in this field as in others, the
EU appears as an efficient public authority, able to tackle problems the national
government is unable to. Generally speaking, countries where the confidence in
the national government is low because it is perceived as a political system in
crisis (Belgium, Italy, Greece) tend to understand the EU as a remedy to internal
evils.
There is, however, some monetary peculiarity in this phenomenon. As far as
other competencies are concerned, persons asked are less enthusiastic with
European action in Belgium: if humanitarian aid is seen as a valuable common
                                                
126 European Commission, DGX, European Public Opinion on the single currency, January
1999.
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policy by 74%, immigration by 63%, defence by 62%, EC unemployment
policies are only supported by 53%, health and social welfare by 37%.
However, fighting poverty and unemployment are seen as priorities of the
Union by 93% of persons asked, peace and security by the same proportion,
fighting organised crime by 89%, while implementing the Euro successfully is
seen as priority by “only” 75%. These results can be explained by classic
hypothesis. According to most political scientists, the end of the century is
characterised by deep worries among European citizens concerning their
physical and material security – they are, in political sciences jargon,
materialistic citizens127. This explains why they mention all “security matters”
as priorities. This hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that, when they are asked
what the priorities of the European Parliament should be, they select the same
items. Just to take one example: 69% think the EP should focus on
unemployment, while only 53% think unemployment should be a common
policy! This may be understood as follows: when they see a list of items
presented as possible priorities, people select those they consider as priorities
generally speaking, without really bearing in mind the question of which level
of authority tackles with these problems. The two kinds of questions are, in
other words, not really connected: a quasi-unanimity of Belgians can consider a
common currency as a good thing while a much smaller proportion sees it as a
priority.
It would be interesting to focus on the socio-cultural differentiation of these
data. But the results published by Eurobarometer are aggregated at the
European level. It is well known that this “harmonisation” conceals social
differences: compared with more precise national polls, differences between
                                                
127 See D. KLINGEMANN et D. FUCHS (Eds.), Citizens and the State, Beliefs in Government
Vol. I, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
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educated and not educated people are always smaller128. They are, however,
significant. At the EU level, 70% of self-employed and managers are for the
Euro, while only 53% of retired persons 57% of manual workers and 68% of
unemployed are for. This is a classic phenomenon too: persons who are active
in social life tend to welcome political innovation with more enthusiasm than
isolated persons. The same holds true for the level of education: 72% of those
who have studied beyond the age of 20 are for the Euro, while only 54% of
those who have stopped education before the age of fifteen share the same
opinion. It must be recalled that this last factor may produce a bias in the
analysis of the impact of the age of persons on their opinion: though young
people are generally more favourable to the Euro (64% for the 15-24 years old)
than older ones (56% of people aged 55+), this may actually be due to the fact
that younger people are more educated than older ones. In any cases, the Euro
is, as European integration taken as a whole, a “privilege of the privileged”.
1.2.2 Trust in the European Central Bank
The average support for the ECB does not seem to be very high in the EU (42%). It
must however be recalled that, apart from the European Parliament (50%) and the
Court of Justice (44%), other institutions have lower records: 40% for the
Commission; 36% for the Council; and only 22% for the Committee of the
Regions. The Belgian situation is close to the EU average in this case: 44% tend to
trust the ECB. It is much less than its two Benelux partners: the Netherlands (68%)
and Luxembourg (61%). Within the members of the euro-zone, Belgium reaches a
medium rank: higher than Spain (37%), France (41%), Portugal (42%), but lower
than the other Benelux countries and Finland (54%), Germany (50%), Italy (49%),
Ireland (48%), Austria (44%). More instructive is the fact that 29% have no opinion
                                                
128 See the classic study of A. PERCHERON, « Les Français et l'Europe : acquiescement de
façade ou véritable adhésion ? », in Revue française de sciences politiques, 1991, Vol. 41,
n° 3, pp. 382-407.
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on this question (while only 14% in the case of the EP and 15% for the
Commission). This high level of “no answer” may be understood as a sign of the
relatively low notoriety of the ECB (the level of “no answer” for the committee of
the Regions reaches 46%).
The existence of the ECB and its independence of Member States are usually not
debated in Belgium. 72% of persons asked support this, Belgium being at the third
rank here (after its two Benelux partners again and ex æquo with Italy). This simply
means that the independent ECB is seen as a normal consequence of the EMU, less
debated than is the case in some other Member states. 77% also think that the ECB
has to be accountable to the European Parliament. Here six northern countries have
reached higher scores. Parliamentary controls in Belgium are usually very poor, as
compared to the tradition of Scandinavian and British democracies and this may
explain the relative indifference of public opinion to this question.
1.2.3 Information about the Euro
Persons asked in Belgium usually think that they have received information about
the single currency (91%), though a much smaller proportion feel informed (63%).
These are relatively high levels, compared to the EU averages (78%/45%) and even
to the euro-zone averages (87%/51%). 98% have heard about the Euro, 82% know
its name and 68% are able to answer some simple questions about it. These scores
are close to, and somewhat higher than, the Euro-11 average. Most of them have
been informed through television (71%) and banks (62%). The information they are
looking for concern the practical aspects of the Euro: its value (92%), how to avoid
fraud (92%) and banking implications (90%) more than the macro-economic and
institutional consequences it might have.
1.2.4 Feelings about the Euro
When asked about their feelings about the Euro, most persons mention their interest
(76%) and a large majority of them say they feel “European” (61%). More
sentimental feeling do not seem to be part of the question: a quite small proportion
79
feel “enthusiastic” (41%) and very small proportions express fears to be
“powerless” (37%) or sadness (15%).
Most worries about the Euro remain limited to very practical aspects of the
question: people are, in a much larger proportion than in other member states,
worrying about the consequences the Euro might have on prices (67%, as
compared to 35% in the Euro-11), on the use of coins and notes and on the value of
their money (67%; respectively 35 and 42 % in Euro 11). A pragmatic people must
have pragmatic feelings.
1.3 Provisional conclusions
Belgium has always been perceived by its inhabitants as a small and open
economic space. Interdependence, co-operation and integration have thereby
always been praised by Belgian élites and citizens since the beginning of the
century. More recently, the crisis of trust vis-à-vis political institutions has tended
to perceive EU institutions as a remedy to the tensions and the paralysis of the
country.
These long-term elements, combined with a natural disdain of Belgian citizens for
political discussions, probably explain why the Euro is not a debated issue
nowadays. Nationalist extreme-right wing parties are the only segment of the
Belgian citizenry who criticise Europe as a whole and the Euro in particular,
without however rejecting them. Beyond these oppositions, a classic left-right
cleavage can be observed around the spill over expected from the Euro. While
right-wing parties, employers’ organisations and some economists hope that the
Euro will strengthen budgetary discipline and induce more flexibility of labour
markets, left-wing parties and trade-unions call for a “regulative spill-over”
consisting in the rise of an “economic government” and the creation of a European
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fiscal and social basis, designed to avoid social and fiscal dumping. Governments
being coalitions between both wings, official Belgian positions usually amount to
compromise between these two positions.
While public opinion are generally in favour of the Euro in Belgium, even if their
general trust in the EU has been declining in the last years, worries about the
practical problems which might follow the transition to the Euro seem to be
growing. Interests groups have already, though without much public debate, drawn
the attention of leaders on some “negative externalities” the Euro might have in
micro-economic terms. Since people seem to try and delay these problems until the
very last moment, it is not impossible that, as conscience of these problems grows,
the general support of public opinion will decline in the following months.
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2. Legal Framework
by Diego Devos*
With the contribution of Vincent Meunier and  Jacques Delpérée
2.1 The law as it stands
2.1.1 Introduction
In the course of 1998, the Belgian authorities chose to concentrate in one single
Act the legislative changes that were made necessary in numerous and various
fields by the arrival of the euro and were not yet covered by the Law of
22 February 1998 establishing the organic statute of the National Bank of
Belgium (see below).  The legislative work so undertaken resulted in the Law of
30 October 1998 ("Loi relative à l'euro - Wet betreffende de euro")129, described
below under 2.  A short assessment of the new Organic Law of the Belgian
central bank against the EMU legal convergence's criteria (based on the EMI's
own assessment) is contained in point 3.
2.1.2 The Belgian Law relating to the Euro
a) General provisions
Conversion and rounding
Articles 3 to 6 of the Euro Law are devoted to the conversion and rounding
rules established in accordance with EC Council Regulation No. 1103/97 of 17
June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the introduction of the euro
(especially its articles 4 and 5) which is binding and directly applicable in all
EU Member States.
                                                
* Service Juridique Banque Nationale de Belgique.
129 Moniteur belge - Belgisch Staatsblad of 10 November 1998.
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Article 3 of the Euro Law states that monetary amounts to be paid or accounted
for130, which are expressed in Belgian francs and to be converted into euro, shall
be converted (at the official conversion rates) into a monetary amount expressed
in the euro unit which amount shall be rounded to two decimals.
In the opposite case, monetary amounts to be converted from euro into BEF
shall be converted at the official conversion rates (with six significant figures:
1 euro = 40,3399 BEF) and then be rounded up or down to the nearest franc
(one franc higher if the decimals are equal or higher than 50 cents, one franc
lower if below to 50 cents) (article 4 of the Euro Law).
Any breach to the obligations laid down in the above articles 3 and 4 of the
Euro Law relating to conversion and rounding rules shall be punished by penal
sanctions (fines and/or imprisonment), with specific rules for the relations
between public authorities and the general public on one hand, and on the other
hand, for the relations between employers and employees.  Article 6 states
expressly that a difference of one cent between the amount of a claim expressed
in euro and the amount resulting from its conversion first in BEF and then in
euro does not affect neither the discharging character of the payment, nor the
accurateness of the book-entry of the claim, when the above difference comes
from the conversion and rounding rules laid down in the Council Regulation
1103/97.
Reference rates
                                                
130 The same  rule is also applicable to other monetary amounts (especially for small value
payments) expressed in BEF and in euro, which shall be converted into euro rounded up to
two decimals at least.  A Royal Decree of 27 November 1998 has made application of this
specific rule in the fields of work regulations and social security (after conversion of amounts
in BEF into euro, they are rounded with two additional decimals).
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Article 7 of the Euro Law substitutes the rates of the European Central Bank, as
single monetary policy authority within the Euroland, to the previous monetary
policy rates fixed by National Bank of Belgium (in particular the tender rates
and the discount rate for bills of exchange131), for the purposes of the references
to such NBB rates in statutory, regulatory or contractual provisions (generally
referring to such rates for the calculation of penalties for late payments).
A Royal Decree of 26 November 1998 has implemented in practice the above
rule by setting up a concordance table showing for each and every rated
previously used by the NBB and GDI, the new ECB rate applicable as
substitute.
In the same vein, references to BIBOR (Belgian Interbank Offered Rate) made
in statutory, regulatory or contractual provisions are replaced by reference to
EURIBOR (or EONIA) rate.
Tax and administrative provisions relating to the euro
One should mention in particular article 9 of the Euro Law which gives to the
taxpayers the option to establish in euro their income declaration132, in which
case this choice will be mandatory for the following income declarations.
The same principle also applies for VAT declarations according to article 14 of
the Euro Law.
b) Financial provisions
                                                
131 There was also intermediation here of the Guarantee and Discount Institute (Institut de
Réescompte et de Garantie), now abolished.
132 In case of balance-sheets supporting the income declaration, this latter must however
follow the currency unit in which the balance-sheet is expressed.
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A part of the Law of 30 October 1998 is, unsurprisingly, devoted to financial
markets.  It covers actually three types of provisions, which will be described
successively hereunder.
Redenomination of debt securities
Article 8.4. of the EC Council regulation N° 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the
introduction of the euro allowed the Member States to redenominate in euro the
public sector debt securities denominated in their own "in" currency.  The
above-mentioned Law of 30 October 1998 made use of this possibility.  On the
one hand, the Law itself decrees the redenomination of the most important
categories of securities issued by the Belgian State133.  On the other hand, the
Law authorises the Belgian government134 and the organs of the public sector
issuers135, each for its own field of competence, to redenominate other debt
securities.
Article 8.4. of the said Council regulation provides for that the decision by a
Member State to redenominate the public sector debt securities issued in its own
currency creates a similar possibility for the other issuers of securities
denominated in this currency (unless the applicable contractual provisions
expressly prohibit it).  Accordingly, the Law of 30 October 1998 specifies the
terms applicable to the redenomination of securities governed by Belgian law
and issued either in Belgian franc or in another "in" currency of a State that
chose to redenominate its debt136.
                                                
133 Article 15, par. 1.
134 Article 15, par. 3, Articles 16 & 17.
135 Article 18.
136 Article 19.
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In regulating the redenomination mechanism, the Belgian legislator followed
three basic principles:
- favouring the redenomination of purely dematerialised securities, while
discouraging the redenomination of physically represented securities137;
- guaranteeing the correct information of the securities holders (the issuer must
publicise in the Official journal its decision to redenominate, as well as the
modalities of the redenomination process)138;
- increasing the legal certainty of the redenomination by limiting the grounds
upon which it may be questioned in court and by fixing a short term of
limitation for any judicial action139.
A Royal Decree of 26 November 1998 (Monit. 1 December 1998) has further
specified the Euro Law with regard to the conversion of BEF into euro in the
fields of dematerialised public-debt securities issued and held in the NBB
clearing system.
Suppletory exchange rates
Article 212 of the Belgian Law of 4 January 1990 140 provided for that the
exchange rates published by the Belgian central bank would apply to the
currency conversion operations on a suppletory basis.
The arrival of the euro required amending this provision for two reasons:
- the conversion rates between the euro and each "in" currency, as well as
between two "in" currencies, would be fixed according to the EC Treaty;
                                                
137 See for instance the distinction made in Articles 15 & 19.
138 Article 20.
139 Article 21.
140 "Loi relative aux opérations financières et aux marchés financiers - Wet op de financiële
transacties en de financiële markten" (Moniteur belge - Belgisch Staatsblad of 22 December
1990).
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- the allocation of tasks inside the ESCB implied that the indicative exchange
rates of the euro towards the most important "out" and non-EC currencies
would henceforth be published by the ECB.
Consequently, the Law of 30 October 1998141 amended the said Article 212.
This provision provides from now on for that, in so far as Belgian law is
applicable, the indicative exchange rates published by the ECB will suppletorily
be applicable to the conversion operations between, on the one hand, the euro or
the Belgian franc and, on the other hand, the "out" and non-EC currencies.
Amendments necessitated by the advent of the ECB
The Belgian legislator felt it necessary to adapt various provisions in the
financial market legislation in order to prepare the arrival of a new actor in the
financial sphere, i.e. the ECB.  One may flag, notably, the following
amendments:
- the addition of the ECB among the persons which may conduct banking and
financial intermediation activities in Belgium142;
- the addition of the ECB among the issuers which may issue securities (debts
certificates, in particular) in public offering in Belgium without the approval
of the Belgian public authorities143;
- a waiver of the insider dealing prohibition for the monetary policy and foreign
exchange policy operations of the ECB144;
- the addition of the ECB to the list of institutions for which Belgian law
specifically guarantees the enforceability of contractual netting and closeout
provisions145.
                                                
141 Article 26.
142 See notably Articles 28, 29, 31, 33 & 34.
143 Article 32.
144 Article 25.
145 Article 38.
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Other provisions in the fields of company and financial laws, consumer
protection, continuity of contracts and social law
Most public limited companies ("sociétés anonymes, sociétés en commandites
par actions, SPRL, sociétés coopératives") are encouraged to convert their
capital into euro units between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2001 with
subsequent rounding of this capital through specific limited capital increase, by
way of simplified procedures, under a preferential taxation regime.
The legislation relating to the balance sheets of credit institutions, UCITS, and
other financial institutions has also been adapted, by several Royal Decrees of
26 November 1998, in order to allow to express balance sheets (including
consolidated balances) either in BEF or in euro.
As far as the general legislation on balance-sheets of enterprises is concerned,
one must mention the Royal Decree of 15 December 1998 relating to the euro
change-over in accountancy law (Monit. b. 25 December 1998) allowing
enterprises to establish their balance-sheets in euro, and several opinions of the
Commission of Bookkeeping Standards ("Commission des normes
comptables") in relation with the establishment of balance-sheets in euro and its
consequences (Avis CNC 173/1, Bull. CNC n° 37, January 1997), the
bookkeeping treatment of rounding (Avis CNC 173/2, Bull. CNC n° 42,
February 1998, among others) as completed, from a taxation perspective, by
circulars of the Tax administration (cir. n° CI.D 421/494.543 dated 8 October
1997).
The Belgian legislator has specified, during the preparatory works of the Euro
Law, that any prices must still be expressed in BEF and not only in Euro
88
(before the end of the transitional period).  But of course, double indication of
prices is recommended.
By a Royal Decree adopted on 17 December 1998 (Monit. 29 December 1998,
41298) the King has adopted specific rules aiming at the protection of
consumers according to articles 55 to 57 of the Euro Law146, in particular when
there is a (non-mandatory) double indication (in BEF and in euro) of prices, for
example in retail commerce, consumers credit or mortgage loans.
One can however note that the freedom to publish prices expressed in BEF and
in the euro might also be viewed on the other hand as delaying the single use of
the euro since the "man in the street" could still rely only on prices expressed in
BEF and may forget the prices in euro when applicable.  In other business areas,
specific statutory authorisations to express prices in euro shall be required
before the end of 2001, like for petrol pumps.
In the same vein, as a specific rule aiming at implementing the principle of
continuity of contracts (as laid down, in a general manner, in article 3 of
Council Regulation No. 1103/97) in the area of consumers' protection, article 58
forbids expressly the seller to unilaterally alter or terminate a contract covered
by the law on consumers' protection of 14 July 1991, because of the
introduction of the euro, subject to those contracts which have been negotiated
on a case-by-case basis (to be justified by the seller).
As far as public administrations (including tax administrations) are concerned,
the transition to the euro (in particular for computer applications) should start in
the course of this year 2000, under the aegis of the Belgian "Euro
                                                
146 See also the Royal Decree of 15 December 1998 implementing article 17 of the Law dated
12 June 1991 relating to the credit to consumers.
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Commissariat", with application of the above-mentioned conversion and
rounding rules, taking into account the peculiarities of this area.
Concerning the activities of social secretariats which are managing social
formalities of most enterprises, those bodies would prefer a straightforward
computer change-over on the first of January 2002 in order to avoid dual
regimes in the meantime.  They should therefore still be authorised to fill in
documents expressed in BEF after 1 January 2002 provided that they are
relating to transactions in BEF carried out in 2001.  But an early transition to
the euro in 2001 cannot be excluded.
Conversion of payment of monetary amounts and of bank accounts
expressed in BEF into euro; exchange of (old) banknotes and coins
expressed in BEF against the new banknotes and coins denominated in
euro (and vice-versa)
Article 59 of the Euro Law stipulates the "free of charge" principle for any
conversion of payments of monetary amounts or of bank accounts expressed in
BEF into euro (or vice-versa) during the transitional period.  As from the 1
January 2002 (subject to limited front-loading operations earlier on), exchange
of banknotes and coins shall also be carried out by the financial institutions free
of charge for their (regular) customers, under time and proportion limits to be
further determined (before October 2001) by the financial sector.
One must point out that a draft bill has just been adopted by the Belgian
Government at the end of 1999 in order to get from the Parliament a special
delegation allowing the Executive to simplify and co-ordinate further Belgian
legislation with regard to the euro (in particular the amounts, rates, tables, a.s.o.
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stated in the current laws and the application of price-pegging (indexation)
regime).
Special Euro legislation have also been adopted, at regional level, by the
Flemish Parliament on 14 July 1998 (Monit. 31 July 1998), by the Walloon
Region on 25 February 1999 (Monit. 12 March 1999) and by the Region of
Brussels on 11 March 1999 (Monit. 16 July 1999, 27380), in order to mirror the
main provision of the Euro Law applicable at national level (choice of currency
in administrative declarations, double pricing, etc.).
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2.1.3 The new organic law of the National Bank of Belgium dated 22nd
February 1998 (Moniteur belge 28.03.1998, p. 9377147; hereafter "the new
law") and other monetary legislations
In accordance with Article 108 of the Rome Treaty, Belgium was under the duty
to ensure, at the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB, the
compatibility of its national legislation, and in particular of the statutes of its
national central bank, with the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB.
The following is an overview of the adaptations made in the Belgian monetary
legislation in order to meet Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three of
Economic and Monetary Union. This text is based on the assessment of
Belgium against the legal convergence's criteria made by the former European
Monetary Institute in its "Convergence Report" of March 1998 (Annex to
chapter II: "compatibility of national legislation with the Treaty/Statute, pages
306 to 308; see also the EMI report of October 1997 entitled "Legal
convergence in the Member States of the European Union", in particular the
specific criteria discussed, pages 2 to 5).
a) Legislation within the scope of Article 108 of the Treaty
The following legislation required adaptation under Article 108 of the Treaty:
- the Organic Law on the National Bank of Belgium of 24 August 1939 as
amended (the "old law");
- the Law of 12 June  1930 creating a Monetary Fund;
- the Law of 28 December 1973;
- the Law of 23 December 1988;
- Decree-Law N° 5 of 1 May 1944.
                                                
147 See also the Explanatory Memorandum of this Law (Doc. Ch. session 1996-1997, 1061/1).
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b) Adaptation of the statute of the National Bank of Belgium
The following points in particular have been amended in order to meet the
Treaty/Statute requirements.
Independence
With regard to the Bank's independence, the following adaptations of the old
law have been made in the new law with effect from the date of the
establishment of the ESCB (1 June 1999).
Institutional independence
Article 29 (old) gave the Minister for Finance the right to oppose the execution
of any measure adopted by the Bank which would be contrary to the law,
statutes or interests of the State. In addition, Article 30 (old) gave the
Government Commissioner the right to suspend any decision by the Bank that
would be contrary to the law, statutes or interest of the State. These articles
were already amended by the Law of 22 March 1993, but the possibility for the
Minister for Finance or the Government Commissioner to challenge decisions
of the Bank on legal grounds, which could potentially also extend to decisions
on ESCB-related tasks, was maintained and, therefore, remained contrary to the
independence required by the Treaty/Statute. This possibility has now been
restricted by Article 22 (new) to the Bank's non-ESCB related tasks.
In addition, whereas under the old law the Council of regency was competent to
take certain monetary policy decisions (article 23; article 64 of the old statute),
Article 20 (new) restricts the Council of Regency's involvement to an advisory
role without an ex ante right of consultation (which was contrary to the
independence of central banks).  The provisions of the old law concerning the
competencies of the Council of Regency have been abrogated on the date of
establishment of the ESCB (Royal Decree of 24 April 1998, articles 2 and 5).
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Personal independence
Under Article 44 of the old statutes of the Bank, the Governor could be
suspended or dismissed by the King without indication of a reason. This
incompatibility with Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute has been resolved in
Article 25 (new), in which the grounds for dismissal are reproduced as laid
down in Article 14.2.
Legal integration in the ESCB
With regard to the Bank's legal integration, the following adaptations have been
made with effect from the date on which Belgium adopted the single currency.
Statutory objective
The old law neither reflected the primacy of the ESCB's statutory objective nor
anticipated the Bank's integration in the ESCB. This has been resolved in the
new law through the fact that the Bank's statutory objective in Stage Three is
determined by directly applicable Community law and in particular Article
105(1) of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Statute and through Article 2 (new),
which explicitly acknowledges the Bank's integration in the ESCB.
Tasks
Articles 6 to 9 (old) on the issuance, design, text, replacement and withdrawal
of banknotes did not recognise the ECB's powers in this field. This has been
resolved in Article 2 (new) through the general reference to the Bank's status as
an integral part of the ESCB. In addition, Articles 11 to 19 (old), which listed
inter alia the Bank's tasks, have been adapted in Chapter II, Articles 5 to 9
(new), which bring the description of the Bank's tasks into line with the Treaty
and the Statute as far as ESCB-related tasks are concerned.
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Instruments
Articles 11 to 19 (old), which established inter alia the instruments which the
Bank was empowered to apply in carrying out its tasks, have been adapted in
Chapter II, Articles 5 to 9 (new) so as to be in line with the Treaty and the
Statute (in particular articles 17 to 24 of the Statute of the ESCB relating to
monetary policy transactions, clearing and payment systems, external
operations) in this respect.
Organisation
Whereas under the old law the Council of Regency had the competence to take
certain monetary policy decisions, in Article 20 (new) its role has been
restricted to advisory tasks, as indicated earlier.
c) Adaptation of other monetary legislation
Law of 12 June 1930 creating a Monetary Fund
Article 1 of this law, which sets a limit on the volume of divisionary monies
which may be issued by the Treasury (which may be extended by Royal
Decree), did not recognise the ECB's power of approval of the volume of
issuance as laid down in Article 105a (2) of the Treaty. The so-called "euro
legislation" of 30 October 1998 has removed this incompatibility (art. 40 and
seq.)
Law of 28 December 1973
Articles 1 to 3 of this law relating to budget proposals for 1973 and 1974, which
were the legal basis for the imposition of minimum reserves on credit
institutions by the Bank before the Third Stage, did not respect the ECB's
competencies in this field. According to Article 38 (4), third paragraph, of the
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new law, the above provisions have been repealed with effect on
1 January 1999 (Royal Decree of 26 October 1998, art. 3, 2°).
Law of 23 December 1988
Article 2 of this law, which authorised the Government to determine the
exchange rate of the Belgian franc without prejudice to international obligations
applicable to the Belgian State, neither envisaged the introduction of the euro
nor recognised the Community's powers in the field of exchange rates.
According to Article 38(4), fourth paragraph, of the new law, the above article
has been repealed with effect on 1 January 1999 (Royal Decree of
26 October 1998, art. 3, 3°). The same applies to Article 3 of this law, which
entrusted a special regulatory power to the Minister for Finance with regard to
the application of Royal Decrees relating to the Government's power to
determine the exchange rate for the Belgian franc. According to Article 38 (4),
fourth paragraph, of the new law, Article 3 of the Law of 23 December 1988 has
also been repealed with effect from the date on which Belgium adopted the
single currency.
Decree-Law N 5 of 1 May 1944
This Decree-Law was incompatible with the Treaty and the Statute to the extent
that it related to the execution of international payment, exchange and
compensation agreements entered into by the Bank for the account of the State and
to the extent that it related to credit activities exercised by the Bank outside the
scope of monetary policy such as bilateral payments agreements with foreign states.
According to Article 38(4), second paragraph, of the new law, this Decree-Law has
been repealed with effect on 1 January 1999 (Royal decree of 26 October 1998,
art. 3, 1°).
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2.2 National law from the EC perspective
No possible conflicts or redundancies vis-à-vis Community law have been
identified or reported so far.
2.3 The Application of the law
To the best of our knowledge, no proceedings or case law on these issues have
been initiated or handed down at this early stage.
